The Arizona Cardinals and 4^th overall pick Marvin Harrison, Jr. came to terms yesterday on a four year, $35,374,742 contract. As has become custom with draft picks, contract details get reported on as if there was some unexpected twist. Certainly, that isn’t the case as we had this as Harrison’s projected contract for maybe two months now and rookie contracts are basically all boiler plate deals. I thought it might be a good time to take a trip down memory lane and look at how one of the old rookie contracts worked, using another former Cardinals draft pick- Larry Fitzgerald- as an example.

The Base Contract Value

The base value of the contracts in the old system was not so different than today’s contracts.  Most of the contracts were five year contracts with an option to extend to six years. However, the option decision (or salary advance mechanism) were made after the first season was complete, not multiple seasons as they are now. In almost every case the option was always picked up and generally these were viewed as part of the base value of the contract.

For Fitzgerald the value with the option being exercised was $17,737,500 for six years, an APY of $2.956 million. If they opted to decline the option and instead pay the non-exercise fee (it was an identical number to the option bonus) it would turn the contract into a a five year, $16.382 million contract, an APY of $3.276 million. Here is the cash schedule of that contract.

As for the guarantee, for this particular contract the original 2005 to 2008 salaries were fully guaranteed at signing. Those totaled $6.825 million. The 2004 salary was not guaranteed but clearly was going to be earned. The guarantee was protection against being released prior to the option as the option payment would void the remaining guarantees even though the option was lower than the $6.825 million salary.

The One Timer/Log Bonus

All of the old rookie contracts had a bonus that was available every year of the contract but once earned would be void in any year thereafter, making it a one time bonus, hence the name one timer. The phrase log bonus was also used to describe these bonuses because earning it was as easy as falling off a log.

Here were the provisions needed to earn the bonus. In the rookie year

35% playing time and any one of the following:

Rookie of the year

Offensive rookie of the year

41 receptions

Leads team in receptions

801 receiving yards

18.6 yards per reception

12 touchdowns

1,601 total offensive yards

Team improves in net yards on offense provided it is not bottom five in the NFL

Team improves in net yards per pass play provided it is not bottom five in the NFL

Team’s win total increases and not bottom five in the NFL.

If earned Fitzgerald would receive a one time payment of $2.7 million which would be paid early in the second year of the contract.

If unearned, Fitzgerald would have the same opportunity to earn the bonus based on his 2^nd year performance. The terms were identical except the playtime threshold would increase to 45% playtime. If unearned in year two the same terms would apply in year 3.

Most players earned this bonus based on the year one performance. Here is now how the salary structure of the contract looks.

The contract is now up to $20.4 million, a $3.4M APY.

Log Escalator Clauses

The one timer criteria also applied to salary escalators in the contract. The first escalator was available in 2006. This would be unlocked if the one time bonus was earned based on Fitzgerald’s performance in either 2004 or 2005. It would increase his 2006 salary by $2.75 million.

The 2007 salary could also escalate by $2.75 million if he fulfilled that one timer criteria in any of the 2004, 2005, or 2006 seasons.

In 2008 the escalator was worth $3.5 million and he could earn this provided he fulfilled that one timer criteria one time between 2004 and 2007.

The biggest one was in 2009. Here the salary would escalate by $11 million if he hit the one timer criteria in any one season prior to 2009.

Here is what the contract looks like if the 2007 escalator is earned.

The contract is now up to $40.437 million, an APY of $6.7 million. This was the likely to be earned value of the contract since the bonuses were so easy to earn. In later years players would have more protection in the event they did not earn the bonuses right away as escalators would double up (i.e the 2007 escalator would be worth $5.5 million if the 2006 escalator was unearned). The escalators would also be guaranteed in many cases once unlocked.

To put the contract in perspective, the four year value would work out to an APY of $5.87 million in 2004. That is the same value as a player selected 8^th in 2024. The salary cap in 2004 was 80.58 million it is over $250M right now. The fifth year options move the salary further for today’s players but this just illustrates how much teams now benefit from the new rules.

If we assume that contracts just grew with the cap (and the reality is they outpaced the cap) Fitzgerald’s contract in today’s salary cap era would be worth $128.1 million, an APY of $21M over 6 years. It would make him the 14^th highest paid receiver in the NFL without playing a down of football.

The High End Escalators

Rookies were also rewarded for outperforming the basic contract parameters. Typically these were only made available after the one timer was earned (though in almost every case it would be impossible to earn these without hitting the one timer).

The first escalator was in 2007. This was worth $5 million and would be earned if Fitzgerald wound up with 270 receptions from 2004-2006. He did not earn this as he fell 40 receptions short. This one was a near impossible escalator.

There were two escalators in 2008. The first was a $5 million escalator that would be earned if selected to one Pro Bowl between 2004 and 2007. Fitzgerald did achieve this in 2005.

The second escalator was worth another $5 million and that required two Pro Bowls between 2004 and 2007. Fitzgerald achieved this in 2007.

In 2009 there was a $5 million escalator which was also tied to one Pro Bowl selection between 2004 and 2007.

Here is what the max package would look like for Fitzgerald if he achieved all of the escalators.

Now we have a six year, $60.4 million contract, an APY of just under $10.1 million per year.

Putting it All In Perspective

Because Fitzgerald’s contract was tied to Pro Bowls we have an easier comparison to today’s NFL players. Fitzgerald’s contract allowed him to reach $38 million over five years. A wide receiver in 2024 with one Pro Bowl in the first three years would wind up with a fifth year salary of around $20 million. That would put this 2004 contract on par with the 10^th or 11^th pick in the draft in terms of five year value.

Fitzgerald’s six year value was $55.5 million. The comparison we would make here would be picking up the fifth year option and then tagging the player. Because the tag value would be very high that would drop Fitzgerald rookie contract to around the value of the 20^th pick in the draft, which is pretty good for a contract that is 20 years old.

If we inflate these numbers for the growth in the cap we would have a max value of $191 million or a ridiculous $31.9M per year, which would make him the 2^nd highest paid receiver in the NFL. Based on what he earned it would be the equivalent of a $29 million per year contract.

These numbers are why teams had far less leverage in extensions talks. Not only were these contracts a salary cap nightmare because of the heavy back end escalation but the players already made a great living just by being productive players. In today’s NFL the first real payday comes when the player can sign an extension so the player winds up rushing into it whereas a player like Fitzgerald would have had a $100M+ cushion just based on his rookie contract. Everyone would benefit because Fitzgerald’s eventual extension would be massive since he had the leverage. Those benefits have all vanished for the players.

This one was actually a pretty straightforward contract compared to what things would become just a few years later as guarantees grew more and more and options to earn them grew more and more. But these contracts all required far more effort and thought and were much more meaningful than anything in today’s NFL.

With the Jared Goff extension in the books attention has turned to the salary expectations for a number of quarterbacks including Trevor Lawrence, Dak Prescott, Tua Tagovailoa, and Jordan Love. I wanted to dive a little bit into historical contract trends at the position to see if there was anything that we could learn from jumps in contract value.

The first thing I wanted to do was to look at quarterbacks signed since 2013 who reset the market. The one complication in this was the out of the box contract that was signed by Patrick Mahomes in 2020 which ran for 10 years at $45 million per season. This contract really seemed to be designed as two five year contracts. The first half of which would be worth $39.55 million per year so that is what I used for him. Here is how this looks

The growth trends since Rodgers blocked the market in 2013 are pretty linear and I think it is safe to say that when looking at the market movement at QB it is probably best to focus on 2016 onward. 2016 seems to be the year that the NFL seemed to give up on the concept of benchmarking to the best player and instead just agreed that every player with some leverage, whether from performance or free agent status, should result in a market setting contract.

We have had a new top market contract in every year since 2016 and in most years it is multiple players. Here are the growth rates for each contract as well as how many days the player held the top spot.

I think it is safe to say that the most important person to the QB market over the last decade has been Aaron Rodgers. Rodgers has set the market three times since 2013 and has three of the five highest growth rates during that period, including the top spot in 2022 at nearly 17% over the prior high. Rodgers has also clearly been the standard during this time frame with three of the top seven in terms of duration at the top of the market.

While Rodgers was a block in 2013 we did see six players land contracts above the prior high during his run on the top and in 2022, three players signed contracts above the Allen level before Rodgers was passed by Hurts. Most of the other players see at most just one player come between the prior high and the next one.

My belief is the NFL thought Mahomes was going to do something similar but when they saw how long his contract ran it was going to be a near impossible number to use. Rodgers leveraging the Packers into a big contract in 2022 at the same time Deshaun Watson was leveraging the Browns into crazy town the Mahomes deal became obsolete.

When looking at the growth rates for the QB contracts I think we can separate QB’s into two buckets of players. One is the true superstar players. These are players that have statistical success, playoff success, and are generally regarded as top players due typically to combinations of draft status and play. Those players have been Rodgers, Mahomes, Luck, and to a lesser extent Allen, Ryan and Stafford. Those players averaged 10.6% in contract growth from the previous high.

On the flip side we have the players whose contracts are based more on circumstance. These players may not have had the great playoff success or draft status and there may be some questions about their game but not to the point where teams are comfortable walking away from the player and/or getting into a fight about the contract. Those players were Jackson, Garoppolo, Cousins, Carr, Hurts, Prescott, Herbert, and Flacco. They averaged just 1.3% growth and really are the guys just playing contract leapfrog.

I think the other thing is that few of the teams likely regretted these contracts (the exception being the 2^nd Flacco contract and maybe to some extent the Wilson contract). The market movers have typically made teams happy. The problems more often come in with the players who are not market movers but land somewhere above a prior high that was in place in the prior two or three years.

So where does that leave the current group of players?

I think the player with the highest potential is clearly Lawrence. While people seem to be surprised that he is seeking “in excess of $50M a year” there is little historically that would suggest he get under that. You would have to go back to Carson Wentz and Jared Goff in 2019 to find two high draft picks with some success that “settled” for a contract. Wentz came in under Rodgers $33.5M a year and Goff tied it at the time Wilson had moved the market to $35 million a year. Even if that became the standard it would put Lawrence around $53 million a year.

The negative for Lawrence is the lack of success. Luck had three 11 win seasons and 3 playoff wins to go along with all of the pedigree and numbers. Burrow, who did not have the same lofty expectations as Luck or Lawrence, had two 10+ win seasons, five playoff wins, and a Super Bowl appearance. Lawrence has had no double digit win seasons and one playoff win.

I think Lawrence would have the most to gain by waiting to sign a new contract. If he were to go out, make the playoffs, and have a playoff run he would track with the group of guys that should see 10% type of growth. That would put him at $60M a year. Even if he does not have the great season it would be likely that the market increases before his next contract anyway, which should only increase his value.

I guess there is an outside chance if he were to sign now that he would be in the Goff/Wentz bucket and not reset the market. Right now I think his contract range would likely be anywhere from $53.5M per year to $56M per year though I would lean more toward the $56M number.  

Prescott is very interesting because he has all of the leverage in the world but the playoff success is non-existent and there may be some concerns on availability. The closest comparison I can see to him would be Flacco in 2016. His contract had become an albatross and that helped him land a new extension even though he had three years remaining on his contract. Flacco was also 31, the same age as Prescott when he did that deal. Prescott has put up more regular season numbers but Flacco did have the Super Bowl win from a few years prior to fall back on.

If Prescott were to get close to a Super Bowl this year I do think he could leverage himself into the Wilson/Stafford/Ryan range, but I think the risk is higher here. An injury would be a big negative as would a bad season. I think if all things stay equal the fair move here would be $55.5-$56.5M per year assuming he is the first to sign a contract and Dallas doesn’t get bogged down in Goff comparisons.

Love comes off the big second half of the year where the team went 6-2 down the stretch and then throttled the Cowboys in the playoffs before a very close loss to the 49ers. Love has some draft pedigree but more in line with Jackson and Hurts than some of the others on the list. Working in his favor is the fact that the Packers have done all those massive deals for Rodgers. While Love is not Rodgers it does show that the organization is more than willing to push the chips on the position.

Love can certainly move the market but I guess the question would be if the Packers want to be cautious since this is all based on a handful of games. That would be similar to Jimmy Garoppolo (7-0 regular season record prior to his extension) and really unlike anyone else, though Hurts’ contract was heavily based on what he did the year prior as well. Right now Love to me falls in the barely move the market range with a contract coming in anywhere from $55.2 to $55.5 million. Love also settled for a really bad contract last year and Green Bay may think he is willing to do the same here and would be aggregable to a deal that does not set the market and is in the $50-$51M per year range.

Finally, we have Tua. I am not sure if he fits the profile of a market mover. He has one 10+ win season and no playoff wins. He is a high draft pick but I feel like his success comes with the asterisk of having a great group of wide receivers on the team. Burrow I believe had the same knock but had plenty more regular season success than Tua has had, not to mention the playoff success and higher draft status. The rumor was that the Dolphins offered him $50 million a year which tells me that Miami is not sold on him as being a surefire bet. That feels like pegging him to a prior market high and working off that.

While there is no rush to sign a contract until the summer, if the Dolphins are indeed offering $50 million a year and a reasonable guarantee package I am not sure why he would turn that down. We have begun to see somewhat of a middle class develop in the QB market with Geno Smith and Baker Mayfield and I feel like Tua would have more potential of landing here or worse as a free agent than landing in the Cousins $45M+ range.  

If Miami did decide to make him the highest paid, I would anticipate that it would be at the lowest possible increase at something like $55.1 million a year if he was the first to sign a contract extension.

Jared Goff signed a four year, $212 million contract extension with the Lions yesterday, completing one of the most amazing comeback stories in the NFL. Goff, who was given up on by the Rams in 2020 and traded to the Lions as a salary dump in 2021, ignited the Lions to a 12-5 record in 2023 and is now set to be their locked in starter for the foreseeable future. Here are some thoughts on the new contract that he signed.

Goff’s new contract will place him second in the NFL in average per year at $53 million, behind only Joe Burrow who signed a five year contract worth $55 million per year last summer. Goff set a new NFL record for signing bonus money at $73 million, $500,000 more than what Lamar Jackson received last season.

The cash flows on the contract are also a big positive for Goff and in no way indicate a backloaded contract. This is the cash breakdown along with where it ranks in the NFL.

$170.6 million is guaranteed for injury while $113.6 million of that is fully guaranteed at signing. This ranks 6^th in injury guarantees and 5^th in full guarantees. Goff was already scheduled to earn $23.6 million this season which brings the real guarantees on the contract to $147 million for injury and $90 million fully guaranteed. The $147 million is 6^th in the NFL while the fully guaranteed portion matches Kirk Cousins $90 million guarantee from the Falcons which is 7^th in the NFL. When factoring in the length of the contract the guarantee is 4^th when valued on a per year basis.

The full guarantee triggers are also favorable to Goff. At signing Goff’s 2024 and 2025 salaries are guaranteed. $20 million of his 2026 salary is already guaranteed. An additional $35 million in 2026 will be guaranteed on the 3^rd day of the 2025 league year. $18 million of his 2027 salary will be guaranteed on the 3^rd day of the 2026 league year. The final $4 million is guaranteed on the 3^rd day of the 2027 league year.

Here is how much new money Goff would earn if cut at any point in the contract prior to the vesting date that March.

The guarantee structure pretty much locks in Goff for three seasons making the decision point 2028. Goff has $8 million in offseason bonus money that should force an early decision on his roster status.

While this is certainly an aggressive contract, the Lions did negotiate slightly better cash flows, relative to the value of the contract, compared to his original deal with the Rams. On a percentage paid per year basis here is the comparison of the two:

As for the salary cap charges, I am not entirely sure at the moment, though we do have estimated online. His cap charge in 2024 should be $27.211 million, a savings of $5.08 million. His 2025 cap charge is $32.6 million but my assumption is that the Lions will pay some of his salary as an option bonus to reduce that figure, though the Lions should be ok with their cap in 2025 so it may not be a concern. The number could be as high as $69.6 million in 2026 but again I would imagine that there is already a cap conversion mechanism in place to reduce that, likely dumping money into void years beyond the expiration of the contract.

Overall, this is an amazingly strong deal for Goff. I’m not sure if many around the league see him as more than a system QB type and I am not sure many expected him to see this kind of salary. Goff will be 30 this year which kind of puts him in no mans land when finding comparisons since most of the market is either 34+ or like U26 at signing. On a cap inflated basis this would work out to $3M more per year than Derek Carr and Matt Stafford’s 2022 extensions though benchmarking against the Covid impacted years is tough. FWIW, Kirk Cousins 2018 contract would be worth around $40M per year in today’s dollars, though that did actually make him the highest paid QB for a minute when it was signed.

Given the size of the contract I think the big mistake for the Lions here is not getting a fifth season. Clearly, they are now committed heavily to Goff and why have a decision point come up again a year early? The recent trend has been five year contracts for quarterbacks with the exception of Cousins, who is 36 making the years far less important to a team. This is an area where the Lions have missed, IMO, with a few players since they are doing four year contracts across the board.

Goff’s contract now goes from a benefit for the Lions to a typical contract for a QB. I wouldn’t call it a negative, but having the 2^nd highest paid player in the NFL increases the requirements for valuable play from Goff. Even though some new players may earn more than him in new money it will only be free agents whose effective contract values significantly top Goff’s since the existing money on rookie contracts is low.

The margin for error for Detroit grows slimmer now due to their better players all landing big contracts. The Lions rank 2^nd with $140.7M per year in new money for the top five players on their roster (the Eagles are 1^st with $151 million). The NFL average is $108M at the moment though that will increase over the summer.

When looking at the top 10 contracts the Lions are now 3^rd in the NFL at $187.4M per year. That trails the Eagles and Browns. The NFL average is $154M so the Lions are much heavier in their top 5 versus their top 10 players.

Does any of this mean anything?  Not necessarily. Like I mentioned above the margin for error becomes smaller when it comes to swinging at unconventional draft picks. Free agency dollars become tighter. But they are fine for this year and next and it is 2026 which is the first year where I think you can see impact, with how much probably depending on what they do in the 2025 offseason which is a long way away.

As for the rest of the QB market?  I am sure they are thrilled. Though Goff has draft standout qualities those have far less importance at 30 on a third NFL contract. I believe he has only been named once to the Pro Bowl on the initial ballot. While I could certainly be wrong I don’t think anyone views him as having the major upside most of the top paid QB’s in the league have.

I would expect this to be similar to the impact Cousins had on the market back in 2018. That quickly set the stage for the QB market to jump from $28M to $30M to $33.5M to $35M in about a year. While Burrow is the number one paid player, Goff is a much easier player to benchmark against if you are Dak Prescott, Tua Tagovailoa, Brock Purdy, or Trevor Lawrence than Justin Herbert and it makes it much easier to make a case for some, not all, of these players to jump Burrow and quickly get the market to $60M+ a year.

Over at the Athletic Football Show the hosts had their 2024 QB Draft yesterday, which you can watch over at Youtube to hear the hosts thoughts on each of their selections. Contracts are included and since I saw some posts discussing the selections and lack of a certain 49ers QB from being selected I thought I would post the listing of annual cap values from 2024 to 2026 for the current projected starters in the NFL.

I broke the salary cap counts down into two sections. One is based just on the average cap per year based on the years remaining, up to a maximum of three years. The second takes into account any dead money that will hit the books in 2025 or 2026 for the players. The numbers are based solely on the current structure of the contract and how each team has decided to take the cap charges these next few years. I also have listed total remaining years under contract. Options are not included unless it was already exercised.

I think Mahomes at number one, even with the big salary cap numbers is an easy choice. He is under contact forever and is the best QB in the NFL. Josh Allen at number 2 is also an easy choice. The Bills have his contract structured over the next few years to be reasonable with the cap and he ranks 4th in years of contract control. I think he is universally accepted as second to only Mahomes when it comes to on field play.

Jackson/Herbert is an interesting decision. Both have been banged up a bit but Herbert’s contract runs longer and is easier on the salary cap because the Chargers extended him early while Jackson made it to free agency. I am surprised Burrow was not right there with these two but he missed so much time last year I can see why you would drop him.

In my opinion once you get past these five the needle should begin to move toward the rookie contract players. Stroud should easily get the nod as the top option, which is where the Athletic had him. After that I think it just depends on who you are bullish on from Stroud’s class and this one.

I would put Purdy in that same group even if the ceiling is more limited. In Purdy’s case you know there is a floor and any of these players who were drafted this year could turn into Zach Wilson or look like Bryce Young last season. Even if you factor in Purdy being extended his 3Y cap would probably wind up around $10M a season. Jordan Love is the other player that belongs in here and he showed a lot of upside last year. His contract would be higher, with my assumption being a 3Y cap around $22-25M a year. So much more expensive but reasonable relative to the top end.

The biggest question mark to me is Dak Prescott. Im not sure what upside there is and we have to account for $95M in cap charges if his contract expires. That is a minefield. Timing would have to be everything on an extension to make this cap remotely reasonable and anything done after the year is going to be a cap per year of $45M+. That should be a hard pass.

Jalen Hurts could be higher depending on long term being a factor. His contract runs a long time and is dirt cheap on the cap but there is a massive bill to pay at the end if things go sideways. If just picking short term though it is fair to put him with the Love group.

The other name I think I would have thought about including is Jared Goff. Though he is going to get an extension I would expect it to run similar to Stafford’s deal which probably puts his three year number at $25-$30M. That is more valuable than Murray’s deal which is going to average nearly $49M per year. Murray has missed 15 games the last two years so while the upside is probably higher with Murray I think the contract and availability tips the scales easily in Goff’s favor.

When I published my annual compensatory picks update after the draft on Monday, I still expressed some doubt about how the NFL Management Council calculated the cutoff between the 3rd and 4th round for 2024, even after Bills GM Brandon Beane provided some useful hints in explaining why the his team and the 49ers did not get the 3rd rounders they (and I) expected.

Thankfully, that doubt is now gone. Per a source that OTC considers reliable, we were informed that the NFLMC calculates contracts that were restructured as entirely new contracts. These contracts are calculated as beginning on the season of the restructure, and include all cap dollars from that season onward–including cap dollars in void seasons. The nature of these calculations make the APY of these restructured contracts much larger than they are in actual cash payment.

To illustrate, let’s use the player that I believe Beane was referring to on the 49ers at the time, Arik Armstead. He originally signed a five year, $85 million extension, for a real APY of $17 million. That contract had a $17.5 million signing bonus prorated over all five seasons at $3.5 million each. However, the 49ers then did maximum restructures on Armstead’s 2022 and 2023 bases salaries, adding more void years in the process. A simple view of the contract before and after the restructures as of 2023 looked like this:

What the NFLMC did for compensatory formula purposes was to take the contract on the right, but only consider the cap numbers for all seasons during and after the restructure, including void years–but for contract length, it ignored void years. What was counted has been highlighted in green and marked with asterisks. After taking out some of the simplicity I have illustrated here, Armstead’s compensatory APY came out to be just a shade over $28 million. (I am guessing that Beane slightly misspoke when he said $26 million).

Once this adjustment was made to OTC’s compensatory formula, it’s amazing how it put everything in proper place, with a proper 3rd/4th round cutoff consisting of the top 5% of the league, around the top 94 players:

As we can see, the contracts of Mike McGlinchey (San Francisco) and Tremaine Edmunds (Buffalo) fell just below the cutoff, as Beane said. We also see Jimmy Garoppolo’s contract above it, but the 49ers did not get a 3rd round comp pick for his departure because they also signed Javon Hargrave, also above the cutoff. This also explains the NFLMC’s mistake in not initially awarding the Bengals a 3rd round comp pick. As it admitted, it omitted Jessie Bates’s Pro Bowl honors, and subtracting those 20 points would have put his contract below the cutoff, and cancelled out by the 4th round signing of Orlando Brown, Jr. It also explains why the 3rd round comp pick for Cincinnati came above the same for Philadelphia, from the departure of Hargrave to the Bay Area.

Although we now have the answer, I do still agree with Beane’s assessment that the Bills and 49ers got a “raw deal” due to counting “numbers that are not really numbers”. Returning to the Armstead example, at no point was he actually getting paid $28 million per season. His maximum compensation was always going to be $85 million over five seasons, thus his APY should have always been judged to be $17 million. I would advise the NFLMC to not calculate restructured contracts in the manner that they did.

With this solved, this change has also been placed in the 2025 compensatory picks projection. Currently, it has not resulted in any changes in that projection from Monday. However, Dolphins fans and observers should show a little bit of caution for the projection of Robert Hunt’s contract, as it is just barely over the 3rd/4th round cutoff in the compensatory formula. But the program is currently using a snap count average over the past four seasons for Hunt that should end up higher if he plays almost all the snaps for the Panthers, as starting offensive linemen tend to do. And also, although at this point it will not matter, I am more convinced that Jonathan Greenard’s contract will likely be valued in the 4th round and not the 3rd– and if so, it would mean that his contract would have not cancelled out Danielle Hunter’s 3rd round valued contract had the Vikings had a net loss of compensatory free agents of greater than 2–instead of the 1 they have now, resulting in only one comp pick for Kirk Cousins going to Atlanta.

With the deadline for unrestricted free agent signings counting toward the compensatory formula having passed a week ago, it’s time to take a look as to where the list of projected 2025 compensatory picks stands as of now.

With the final outcomes in for this years option eligible rookies I thought it would be a good idea to do a quick look at how the option rates have fared since the NFL went to a fully guaranteed fifth year option starting with the 2018 NFL class. Here is the breakdown by pick range

Inside the top 15 we essentially have a 75% hit rate with a majority of players being good enough to at least warrant a guaranteed fifth year salary. That number declines to 55% when we get into the 16 to 25 range of the draft. For the tail end of the draft things fall off a cliff with only a 25% exercise rate.

For what it is worth almost no individual pick is perfect. The 1st overall pick in the draft has had all the players have their options picked up. Pick 5, 7, 13, and 25 are the other ones to have a 100% hit rate. Picks 27 to 29 are the duds so far. The overall average is 57%. Just goes to show that nobody is close to perfect with the draft selection process.

Here is a breakdown by position.

While tight end has not been a record mover the few players selected have all have their contracts extended by a year. Of the higher quantity selections we have good returns on left tackles, receivers. interior defensive line, and pass rushers.

QB comes in at 52.9% which is below average and I would expect this to fall further in the future. These numbers are propped up by mistakes made with Baker Mayfield and Sam Darnold that I do not think will occur in the future. Corner is down at 40% while linebacker and running back are both around 30%. These are both terrible first round selections. They don’t offer the value upside to begin with and when you see the lack of options being exercised it shows how far below expectations these players have been.