As Aaron Rodgers ponders his NFL future, the Steelers protected their rights in the event that he decides to play football this year by extended the UFA tender to Rodgers. The UFA tender is a one year contract that is worth 110% of his prior year salary- about $15 million in this case- and does not impact Rodgers ability, for now, to sign with another team. The tender does ensure that the Steelers would receive a compensatory pick for Rodgers if he did sign with another team during the next two and a half months. Their ability to receive a compensatory pick would have expired had they not extended the tender to Rodgers.

The tender also blocks Rodgers ability to simply wait and see as other situations arise around the NFL. While Rodgers is still free to sign anywhere, the tender will lock Rodgers into only playing with the Steelers if he fails to sign a contract by the start of NFL training camps. If he still does not sign by the end of the 10th week of the season his season will be over.

While this tender is not used often, it has been used for lower cost contracts (for a starting QB Rodgers has a very low salary) where a player still fits a need (obviously they can use a QB). Last year it was used on two players- RB JK Dobbins and WR Elijah Moore. Moore quickly signed with the Bills after receiving the tender from the Browns while Dobbins wound up leaving the Chargers to sign with the Broncos. Neither ended up impacting the compensatory draft selections despite maintaining the UFA status.

Rodgers will count on the Steelers salary cap now that he has been tendered. The Steelers currently have in the ballpark of $11 million in cap room.

The numbers are in for Will Anderson’s record setting $150 million contract extension with the Texans so let’s see just how it stacks up with the rest of the league and how it may help contracts move forward in the future.

First the basic details of the contract. Anderson’s three year extension contains $150 million in new money and runs five years in total as he had two rookie years remaining from his prior contract. He received $134,063,749 in injury protection of which $107,000,000 is new money injury protection, about 71% of the contract value. His full guarantee at signing is $100,063,749. Of that number $73 million is new money, about 49% of the contract.

The full guarantee consists of a $32 million signing bonus, his base salaries in 2026, 2027, and 2028 along with $5.5 million of his 2029 salary. If on the roster on the 5^th day of the league year in 2028 the remaining $34 million of his 2029 salary will be fully guaranteed. His $41.5 million salary in 2030 is unprotected. The only money tied to being active in the contract are $500,000 per game bonuses available in 2028, 2029, and 2030. For each game missed he would lose $29,412.

Here are how the cash flows of Anderson’s contract compare with the other two highest players at his position.

These are solid jumps across the board as he increases the number of Hutchinson by 12% for raise paid in existing contract years, 9.7% of Parsons in first year cash, and 8% and 6.4% in the final two years. Anderson does have a higher level of per game bonuses in his contract, but nothing excessive.

While the guarantees for Parsons ($136M) and Hutchinson ($141M) are both larger those both come with a longer commitment of four years on the extensions. An extra season of contractual control is not worth an extra $7 million in injury protection and really it is the length of this contract that should be the talking point.

NFL contracts for veterans used to be pretty long but have come down in recent years with most settling at four years. Anderson is the only 2^nd contract EDGE player of note with a three year contract (TJ Watt and Maxx Crosby have three years deals but are third contract players and closer to the end than the start of their careers). The only other notable defensive players with a “plus 3” would be Jordan Davis of the Eagles, and Derek Stingley also of the Texans. The only player on offense is Tyler Linderbaum of the Raiders. These types of contracts are ultra rare for star players and the more they pop up the more ammunition it gives agents to demand them. It is worth noting that those players do not earn nearly as much as Anderson as they are all in the $25M-$30M a year range, not $50M a year.

This is a big deal because getting a team to bite on an extension when you only have one year remaining under contract is far easier than when you have two years. It also is a year earlier in the aging cycle and in the NFL declines can come abruptly so the cash in potential on another contract and possibly one last one after that is higher for Anderson than almost any other player in the league. If the market moves he can easily jump with it now.

The Texans barely got any concession on the magnitude of guarantees. They set new highs for every year in terms of cash flow. And they gave up 25% of the contract length to do it. It’s a massive win and should lead to the next star rusher looking for a similar type of year over year raise while also securing just a three year contract to maximize his flexibility with future contracts. That can be a fundamental shift for the NFL if it happens.

With the 1^st round complete I decided to evaluate each trade using the Fitzgerald-Spielberger draft chart. The chart which Brad and I created is based on past results of NFL drafts. These values are not going to be indicative of typical trade markets in the NFL but they do provide you the expected returns on each trade when you wind up with the average outcome.

For each trade we calculate points for each draft pick and the difference between these two sets of points is the implied cost of the trade. That cost can then be translated into a single draft pick.

The expected value added for a team is what that draft slot would project at if we translated the rookie performance into veteran contract value (i.e. a QB selected number 1 in the draft would expect to bring a team a value of $55M, essentially projecting as one of the top 5 players at the position). The value lost is what the picks the team traded away would be valued as. For the team trading up the value will be specific to the position they traded up for. For the team trading down it will be a blind trade since there is no guarantee on positional availability. The difference is how much was gained or lost by moving up rather than picking blind.

7.Dolphins Select CB Chris Johnson

Implied Cost: 163 points (UDFA)

Implied Salary Lost: $127K/Year

An ultra fair trade where it is basically a net even for both sides in this trade. You never get these in the first round and maybe that’s a sign of what people thought of this draft class. The Dolphins get a high upside corner and drop down 48 slots later on to do it. The 49ers, clearly not married to anyone at 27, save a few bucks with the 1^st round pick and get a little higher upside with their second selection. Just a solid move for both sides.

6. Titans Select EDGE Keldric Faulk

Implied Cost: 210 points (The 246^th pick in the draft)

Implied Salary Lost: ($5.65M/Year)

Another very even trade where the Titans get a huge upside position that can make this a great trade while also gaining an option year for a first round pick. This is just the right way to do trades. Move a little up in round one, a little down later on and bit further down in a late round. It keeps the odds high for both sides to land starters/contributors in the draft and not putting all your eggs in one basket. Pick a premium position and the expected return on the trade puts you in a good spot to boot. The Titans certainly have the upside in this trade, but Buffalo makes out fine as well too.

5. Jets Select WR Omar Cooper

Implied Cost: 323 points (The 197^th pick in the draft)

Implied Salary Lost: ($2.47M/Year)

The Jets probably should have insisted on some kind future late pick here considering the 49ers were willing to include an additional pick to Miami just a few minutes before this trade. I guess you can make a case that the premium of the option year is worthwhile and the Jets did select the right position for that to be a factor, but the Titans didn’t require the same a few minutes later. Jets actually come out ahead in potential value because wide receivers are so valuable and as long as Cooper is a capable NFL player worthy of a 2^nd contract in the $13 to $15 million a year range this will go down as a good trade for the team. The 49ers have done a good job of avoiding a 1^st round premium with the two trades they made.  

4. Texans Select G Keylan Rutledge

Implied Cost: 509 points (The 136^th pick in the draft)

Implied Salary Lost: $5.19M/Year

For the most part selecting a guard in the first round isn’t a great idea, though trends are at least changing a bit in regards to that. Trading up to selecting a guard is still hard to justify. Even though the paper cost isn’t huge at the equivalent of the 136^th pick, the value of the guard puts the Texans way down in actual value lost. Making sure they got another pick in this trade was a smart move and still keeps them in a good position to land at least one starter but they probably were better off staying put.

Buffalo makes out pretty well here. They only drop a few spots in round 1 to get a big jump later on plus they add a late pick. This is the right approach to the draft even if the return isn’t a blow away return relative to some past trades.

3. Cowboys Select S Caleb Downs

Implied Cost: 701 points( The 93^rd pick in the draft)

Implied Salary Lost: $7.92M/Year

The bright side for Dallas in this one is it could have been far worse had they gotten antsy and made an earlier trade. I know what everyone will say about the special qualities of Downs and he may be great, but if you are going to make this trade he has to be incredible, essentially the top safety in the NFL by year 2. It is just such an available position it is hard to justify selecting one this high let alone trading up to make the pick.

A steal for Miami who land a more premier position (the value is actually higher than shown since we value the trade down as “blind” and this wasn’t) and a reasonable chance for two contributors later in the draft. Similar to the Bills trade above, just because it isn’t as good as some past trades in a similar spot it was far better than just sitting pat because the deal wasn’t good enough.

2. Eagles Select WR Makai Lemon

Implied Cost: 1,036 points (The 48^th pick in the draft)

Implied Salary Lost: $2.48M/Year

A pretty big premium paid by the Eagles who give up far more for a lower pick than the Cowboys gave up in their earlier trade. An implied cost of the 48^th pick in the draft is a pretty big number, but this is one of those areas where the positional value does lessen the blow for the Eagles here. While Dallas comes up way behind in their trade because they choose a safety, the Eagles are pretty close in value. They don’t need Downs to be a superstar, they just need him to be a high level two or low level one to justify the trade. If he is anything more it is excess value for the Eagles. That makes the number here easier to take, you just wonder if they got too locked in on this one player.

This is a terrific trade for the Cowboys who increase their probability of finding at least one starter and if things go right could easily land two starters with their picks they acquire here.

1. Chiefs Select CB Mansoor Delane

Implied Cost: 1,081 points (The 44^th pick in the draft)

Implied Salary Lost: $6.47M/Year

This trade seemed to catch some people off guard as Delane seemed to be someone who might be available to the Chiefs at 9. This felt a little need based considering they lost their other players, but I do think the Chiefs have the strategy right of getting high level play from rookies or lower cost veterans and then let someone else pay them big after they have had success with the Chiefs while the Chiefs start over. The Chiefs essentially give up the value of the 44^th pick and Delane needs to be a top five corner to justify the move.

A no brainer for the Browns who simply need bodies and don’t lose much dropping three spots while picking up a much better chance of finding two starters than just one.

To gain more flexibility prior to the draft the Bears restructured the contracts of OL Jonah Jackson and TE Cole Kmet to gain $10.375M in cap room. Prior to the restructures the Bears had the least amount of cap room in the NFL, well under $1 million. This gives Chicago some wiggle room in the event they wanted to trade for or trade away a player during the draft.

The Bears converted $13.5 million of Jackson’s salary into a bonus, reducing his cap number by $6.75 million to $12.75 million. His cap number in 2027 now jumps to $23.75 million. Jackson’s final year under contract is 2027 so he will likely be extended next year if he has a good season in 2026.

Kmet had $7.65 million of salary converted to a bonus reducing his cap number by $3.825 million to $7.775 million for the year. His cap number next season is now $15.425 million. 2027 is also Kmet’s final year under contract.

The Bengals made a big splash just a few days before the draft trading for DT Dexter Lawrence of the Giants and giving up the 10th overall pick to make it happen. It’s a huge price to pay for a player who will turn 29 during the 2026 season and is looking for a contract upgrade, but it probably says more about what the Bengals think about this year’s draft than anything else. For the Giants this was a deal they could not turn down especially since they were in a contract dispute with Lawrence.

Lawrence had signed a four year, $90 million contract extension with the Giants back in 2023 which felt like a deal he rushed into and it certainly has not aged well for him. The Giants added some incentives to his contract last year as a band aid to keep Lawrence happy, but the issues, not surprisingly, lingered this year as he seemed set on getting a new contract.

Lawrence still has two years remaining on his contract at salaries of $20 million in 2026 and $22 million in 2027. The current market rate for interior defenders not names Chris Jones is $26 million a year, so my guess would be that we see a three year extension worth $26 to $26.5 million a year. This would likely pacify the contractual situation with Lawrence as it would effectively make him highest paid at the position. From the Bengals point of view they would view such a contract as a five year contract worth around $121 million and $24.5 million a year.

From a financial perspective perhaps the Bengals were more than happy to drop the 10th pick for the chance to get Lawrence. The 10th pick in the draft will earn somewhere in the ballpark of $20 million this year and is unproven. That matches Lawrence’s current salary. While Lawrence will get a raise, perhaps a massive one since the Bengals do not give guarantees beyond their signing/roster bonus in year one, most likely their payout this year will only be $10 million or so more than what they were going to pay pick 10. If you believe this is a weak draft the numbers are easy to justify in the short term. I would also say the long term since there likely will be no future guarantees, but no team has chased sunk contracts costs more than the Bengals have so they likely will honor most of whatever contract they sign regardless of the guaranteed number.

Still this is major draft compensation to give up especially for an unhappy player who wants a new contract. Trading/signing 3rd contract guys is always a big risk and this is no different. The Cowboys made a massive trade last year giving up a 2 and a 1 for a player not yet unhappy with his contract and that so far has looked like a bust for Dallas. While this is not as much value the situations are a little different and the Bengals should have had more leverage which is why I believe they just looked at the 10th pick as a way overpriced asset this year.

This continues a pretty major overhaul of a bad defense for the Bengals. Along with Lawrence they have added Boye Mafe, Jonathan Allen, and Bryan Cook to the team. This feels very much like a put up or shut up year for the coaching staff and they will expect Lawrence to be the addition to get them over the top.

I think this was an easy decision for the Giants. The Giants are in the middle of a rebuild and should not be committing more years to their veteran players at least until they know the upside and downside of QB Jaxson Dart. The reality is the upside of the 10th pick is higher and the peak of that players upside will occur when the Giants may be good. The four year cost is also low enough (around $31 million) to where a number of outcomes justifies the salary in the event the player is not a star.

Lawrence will carry a $13.916 dead money charge for the Giants in 2026, which creates $13 million in cap room. They will free up $28.96 million next year. Numbers wise this is a wash in cash for this year (they save $20M in salary and will pay that to a rookie) and they will be about $29 million better in cap space that can be spent on outside talent in the future. This all just lessens the risk for NY.

This feels like a boom or bust trade for the Bengals. If Lawrence plays as he did a few years ago and the team makes the playoffs the next two years it will be looked at as a solid move. If he doesn’t play at his usual high level or the defense simply doesn’t improve its probably a bust especially if the Giants wind up selecting a future star with the draft pick.

With the NFL draft rapidly approaching I thought it would be a good time to do our look at where teams are hitting on good players in the draft and where we can often find high quality talent in free agency. Using those two numbers gives a strong indication of ways to approach the draft using a positional based valuation approach rather than the pure “he’s the highest graded player on the board” approach. I guess this is a bit more timely since a NFL GM recently said “throw positional value out” when talking about this years NFL draft.

One of the first things that we should be doing when we are building a team is determing the best overall ways to construct a team. Primarily teams build through the draft and free agency so how can we use those to our advantage?  What I wanted to do was take a look at the top paid players at each position in the NFL to see what we can gather from somewhat recent history. Here is where each of the top 10 players were drafted:

While these don’t indicate “hit rates” (for example far more QBs are drafted early than tight ends) they do give us a baseline to consider when planning strategies around positional adjusted rankings of players, which is something that I don’t feel is done enough in the NFL. While a 10 player sample is small it does give me some idea that drafting Corners, EDGE, Offensive Tackles, Wide Receivers, and potentially D-line in round 1 is probably a far better use than on other positions, even when those positions supposedly have a “cant miss unicorn”. Enough good talent is there to find if a team is patient enough.

What about if we expand it to the top 20? That is probably a more realistic representation of finding good quality players in the draft than just the top 10 alone.

I think here we definitely get into the concept of drafting QB, following by our defensive line and finally left tackle as our premium options. Those are followed by WR, CB, and RT. Positions like center, tight end, and safety in particular really see a number of really good players land in the latter half of the draft making it much harder to justify an early selection on those players.

These numbers are important because building the best team is not the same simply drafting the best player with your first pick. A team will most likely be better off landing the 5^th best EDGE in round 1, 15th best wide receiver in round 2, and 15^th best tight end in round 3 and still having a chance at finding some other starters, than landing the overall top tight end in round 1, 7^th best linebacker in round 2, 18^th best EDGE in round 3 and then having limited chances at finding starters later on. 

Coupling this information with free agent availability is also critical.  Why?  The second avenue to team building is free agency. What positions are actually available in free agency with high quality players?  Let’s break it down for the top 20 salaries in the league and who was available in free agency.

These numbers really should be giving us some strong guidance. While there may be a great grading off ball linebacker available in the draft, wouldn’t I be better off as a GM to simply sign a top 5 linebacker in free agency and draft a good left tackle even if he grades a bit lower than taking that linebacker in the draft and signing the 18^th best left tackle? I would think so.

The numbers also show you what positions are more of a 6 to 8 year return (the days of expecting a decade out of most positions is simply not realistic anymore) from a draft versus just a four year return where I lose the player in free agency. In addition every team benefits on the cap if they land an expensive position in the draft versus a less expensive one.

If we plot the free agent availability against the players from round 1 that became top 20 players it really solidifies what positions to strongly consider in round 1 and what ones to avoid.

We can also start looking at the growth from round 1 to the end of round 3 to also classify some ideas of what to do in rounds 2 and 3.

We do start to see some shifts here but the important thing to me is that basically our WR and Interior D-Line pool is gone by this point. Really it gives these positions added value if you are really missing at these positions or did not draft there in round 1. These rounds are also where you can begin to consider guards, right tackles, running backs and linebackers as teams do a better job of identifying the stars by this point. Ultimately if you draft the proper positions and then use the money you have to go and buy the top players at the available positions you should create a far superior team to the one drafting the wrong positions and then overpaying for lower quality free agents at the more expensive positions.

As for the original point made by the GM that this draft is different, I have studied a lot of drafts in the NFL. Quite honestly they never are that different in terms of providing starting level talent, outside of the QB position. Maybe the scouts see them differently but in the end they almost always produce relatively consistent numbers. The only draft I can really think of where it wasn’t the case was 2013. Maybe 2026 will be like that draft but weve heard the stories before about major drop offs after 15 players and lack of studs at the top and 95% of the time the drafts simply produce talented players in the NFL at every position.

Dave Birkett reported today that the Lions decided to exercise their contractual right to force retired center Frank Ragnow to pay back part of his signing bonus due to his retirement. I had a few questions on this and thought it would be good to share some thoughts about situations like this and what is or is not really right from the team’s perspective.

Ragnow signed a four year contract extension with the Lions worth $54 million back in 2021. At the time Ragnow had two years remaining on his rookie contract so the new contract ran six total years and would keep him under contract to Detroit through 2026. As part of the contract Ragnow received a $6 million signing bonus which would be prorated at $1.2 million per year from 2021 through 2025. In addition he received an $18 million option bonus in 2022 that would be prorated at $3.6 million from 2022 through 2026.

There was nothing special about Ragnow’s contract regarding a teams ability to recover bonus money in the event of a breach, such as retirement. Most teams just use boilerplate language in their contracts to indicate that a player is subject to maximum forfeiture as outlined in the CBA. Forfeiture of salary in this case is a maximum of $1.2 million, which was the remaining proration remaining on Ragnow’s contract from his 2021 signing bonus. The option bonus proration was not subject to forfeiture as the NFL only allows option bonus forfeiture if the breach occurs in the season the option is earned.

The NFL rules regarding signing bonus forfeiture are old and don’t really reflect the reality of veteran NFL contracts. The term “signing bonus” is loosely defined as a prepayment of a contract and there was probably a time when that was the case regarding NFL contracts, but that time has passed. Realistically they are nothing more than a salary cap accounting mechanism designed to artificially deflate the salary cap charge of a player. There is no prepayment occurring nor any salary that acts as a “bonus” above and beyond the contracted salary of the player.

The signing bonus given to a rookie fits the bill of a bonus that should be subject to forfeiture. Last year’s number one pick, Cam Ward, received a signing bonus worth $32.15 million. It represents 65.8% of Ward’s entire contract. His salaries read as follows: $32.999 million in year 1, $3.05 million in year 2, $5.28 million in year 3, and $7.5 million in year 4. That first year salary sticks out because the contract is effectively being prepaid in the first year of the contract. The signing bonus is 2.6 times his annual salary. This is a contract prepayment that would not be paid if there was thought the player would breach the contract.

Now let’s compare that to Ragnow. His $6 million signing bonus represents 8.6% of the total value of his contract.  It is 0.5 times the size of his effective APY. His yearly salary runs $7.21 million in year 1, $20.75 million in year 2, $11.65 million in year 3, $8 million in year 4, $9.25 million in year 5, and $12.75 million in year 6. This does not indicate his signing bonus as anything significant relative to his contract to cause it to be treated as anything special. While his contract did make him one of the highest paid centers in the NFL, his yearly cash flows were in line with the market, which includes teams that both use and do not use signing/option/etc…. bonuses.

To chase after a signing bonus, when there is only 1 year left that you can chase after the bonus, and after 67% of a long term contract has been honored is petty on the part of a team. This was not a blindside situation. He had been contemplating retirement and it was very clear that the team knew this since he announced his retirement on June 2^nd, which was the day the Lions could place him on the retired list and split his dead money across two years. He didn’t belittle the team, demand more money, or anything else. In fact he tried to come out of retirement during the year and it didn’t work out. I don’t think any other team in the NFL would have done this to be honest even though it is their right.

It really is time for the agent community to start pushing back against the use of signing bonuses, or at least bonuses with forfeiture provisions, for their veteran players. Teams use them because they need salary cap space. Nothing more, nothing less. The Lions were going to pay Ragnow $7M in 2021 no matter what, They used a bonus to fit it in best with their cap.

There are multiple bonuses that can be used to get a team the salary cap treatment they want while also protecting the players rights. These include guaranteed roster bonuses, guaranteed reporting bonuses, option bonuses, and completion bonuses. Boiler plate language can spell out retirement provisions rather than just blanket “maximum extent” statements. This is especially true of restructure bonuses that team pays as a signing bonus where they simply exercise their right to convert non signing bonus money into a signing bonus for salary cap purposes.

Why the NFL and NFLPA continue to make this different distinction for a signing bonus is baffling. The NFL lost an arbitration decision years ago when they used option bonuses as a prepayment of rookie contracts by advancing the rookies future salary as an option bonus. Due to that all sides now agree you only attack the option if the breach occurs the same year and nobody uses those bonuses as an advance of anything more than current year salary. They agreed to treat roster bonuses the same since more and more teams were using roster bonuses as a way to commit to early offseason salary. The logic behind both of those is that you should not pay a player X only to have them turn around and hold out or retire after getting a large payment.

At this point anyone dealing with the Lions should just refuse the standard signing bonus and force their hand to remove any doubt of this kind of activity, but the potential problem exists league wide and there are easy avenues to prevent it from happening. The time has come to either change the rules or change the negotiations stars are having with their teams.