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# JOHN DORSEY

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Hey, Buddy Boy

JULY 29, 2021  
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
# ABSTRACT

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Being an NFL player means having one of the most scrutinized jobs in the United States. The fans watching the game watch the players do their jobs and talk about how well each one is doing. Members of the media show their highlights and talk about what they did right or wrong. Sports experts watch their tapes, rate their performance, and give them grades based on their play. Everyone wants to rate how well they are performing their job and comment on if they deserve to have their job.

One high profile position in the NFL that has never been graded is the General Manager (GM) position. NFL GMs play critical roles in building the NFL rosters of every team, but they are never rated on how well they perform at their job. They hold similar or greater power than the team's Head Coach, but the coaches are constantly graded on factors such as wins/losses, playoff appearances, Super Bowl wins, etc. The purpose of this paper is to examine the GM position, but more specifically, the performance of ex-GM John Dorsey. In this paper we will examine how well John Dorsey has performed in the different major roles of a GM and then rate his performance. Doing this will create a template that other GMs can be evaluated by.

## TYPICAL NFL POWER STRUCTURE



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# SECTION 1: OVERVIEW

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## GM Responsibilities

The job responsibilities of an NFL GM differ in every organization but can include coaching and staff hiring, scouting, contract negotiations, and player personnel decisions. GMs may also play a role in the business side of the franchise, but for this paper we are only focused on how their performance affects the performance of the team. The four main areas that the GM is responsible for and should be graded on is coaching staff hiring, the draft, signing players, trading. Since John Dorsey was never responsible for the coaching staff selection, that will not be included in his grade.

## John Dorsey History

John Dorsey has a long and impressive history in the NFL. He started his NFL journey as a 4<sup>th</sup> round draft pick of the Green Bay Packers. After his playing career was over, he became a scout for the Packers and held various positions in the Packers and Seahawks organizations from 1997-2012.

In 2012 the Chiefs were coming off 2-14 season and had just fired most of their front office and coaching staff. On January 13, 2013, Clark Hunt, the CEO of the Chiefs, reached a five-year agreement with John Dorsey to be the GM of the Chiefs.<sup>1</sup> He was the GM of the Chiefs from January 13, 2013 until June 22, 2017, when the Chiefs decided to release Dorsey from his contract rather than give him an extension.<sup>2</sup>

Soon after leaving the Chiefs, Dorsey found another job. On December 7, 2017, Jimmy Haslam, the owner of the Browns, reached a four-year agreement with Dorsey, making him the new GM of the Browns.<sup>3</sup> Dorsey did not last long with the Browns, though. Haslam fired him after his second season with them on December 31, 2019.<sup>4</sup>

Dorsey is not currently a GM; he is a senior personnel executive for the Detroit Lions.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.espn.com/nfl/playoffs/2012/story/\\_/id/8839153/john-dorsey-named-new-general-manager-kansas-city-chiefs](https://www.espn.com/nfl/playoffs/2012/story/_/id/8839153/john-dorsey-named-new-general-manager-kansas-city-chiefs)

<sup>2</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20170710205426/http://www.chiefs.com/news/article-2/Chiefs-Dorsey-Agree-to-Part-Ways/90a06198-9204-404f-95a0-dec1e2b7d856>

<sup>3</sup> [https://www.cleveland.com/browns/2017/12/browns\\_hire\\_john\\_dorsey\\_as\\_gm.html](https://www.cleveland.com/browns/2017/12/browns_hire_john_dorsey_as_gm.html)

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/browns-part-ways-with-general-manager-john-dorsey-0ap3000001093675>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.detroitlions.com/news/lions-add-ray-agnew-and-john-dorsey-to-front-office>

## Grading

Dorsey will be graded in each of the three main areas (drafting, signing, trading) that he controlled and then each transaction in those areas will be given a grade. After grading all his transactions, he will receive an overall grade in each area and that grade will be combined from each area to give him an overall grade.

The grading scale that will be used throughout this article is based on the A, B, C, D, F grading scale.

<b>Grading Scale</b>	
<b>A</b>	Excellent
<b>B</b>	Good
<b>C</b>	Average
<b>D</b>	Bad
<b>F</b>	Failure

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# SECTION 2: DRAFT

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## Overview

The draft is the marquee event for an NFL GM and the foundation for roster construction. NFL teams spend years scouting, investigating, and projecting what college players have done, and hopefully will do, for their organization. Teams can add young, talented players that they can mold into the type of players they envision on their team. These players are also cost controlled, giving teams that draft well a large advantage with their salary cap. Every team declares that they want to build their team through the draft, but few franchises can continually hit on their draft picks and build a team this way. In this section we will examine Dorsey's past draft performances and analyze his strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the draft.

To analyze Dorsey's draft performance, only objective data will be used. There are several nonobjective factors that go into a team's draft strategy such as team needs, positional value, and personalities. These are all important for roster construction, but this is solely focused on examining the performance of the players that Dorsey picked. There are also long-term benefits from drafting players (franchise tag/etc), but those will not be considered either. Only the draft picks' performance on their rookie contracts will be analyzed.. It only grades the player on their expected performance compared to outcome.

To make this as objective as possible, there are two rubrics. The first rubric assigns an expected value (points) to each pick based on the pick number. The reason for this is self-explanatory, as the higher a player is picked, the better they should be and the more they should contribute to the team.

Draft Slot	Expected Points
Pick 1-5	7
Pick 6-15	6
Pick 16-32	5
Pick 33-64	4
Pick 65-105	3
Pick 106-184	2
Pick 185-	1

The second rubric grades the player based on their performance and the number of snaps that they played on their rookie contract. Players are assigned a grade by first determining their average Pro Football Focus (PFF) grade over their rookie contract and then finding the average number of snaps they had per year. After those two numbers have been determined, the player is assigned a grade based on Fig. A Grading Scale. For example, if a player had an average PFF score of 67 and averaged 625 snaps per year, the player would be given a score of 4 points.

<b>Fig. A Grading Scale (Snaps on Rookie Contract)</b>		<b>Points</b>
<b>Superstar</b>	AVG PFF grade over 90 and 700 snaps per year	10
	AVG PFF grade over 90 and 350 snaps per year	9
	AVG PFF grade over 80 and 700 snaps per year	8
	AVG PFF grade over 80 and 350 snaps per year	7
<b>Starter</b>	AVG PFF grade over 70 and 700 snaps per year	6
	AVG PFF grade over 70 and 350 snaps per year	5
	AVG PFF grade over 60 and 350 snaps per year	4
<b>Role Player</b>	AVG PFF grade over 60 and 200 snaps per year	3
	AVG PFF grade over 50 and 100 snaps per year	2
	AVG PFF grade over 50 and 50 snaps per year	1
<b>Miss</b>	Did not meet any requirements	0


Since every player has an expected points placed on them based on the spot that they were selected the two numbers can be compared to see if the player underperformed, overperformed their draft spot.

For example, the 4<sup>th</sup> pick has an expected value of 7 points but only generated 5 points. That means that even though this player is a starter on the team, he underperformed his draft position. If the 69<sup>th</sup> pick also generated 5 points, then he would have overperformed his expectations because his expectations were set at 3 points. This means that instead of being just a role player on the team, he played at a starter level.

*Notes: If a player is traded, only the time the player spent with the team will be used in evaluations. If a player is cut, the remaining years of the rookie contract will still be used (lowers avg snaps). 1<sup>st</sup> round picks include 5<sup>th</sup> year of contract.*


## Draft Grades by Round

*Draft Results High Level*




This projected draft value vs results examines the difference in projected value that Dorsey should expect to get from the draft and the results that he achieved. The reason that this chart is effective is because it lets us compare how well Dorsey should have done with the draft picks versus how well he actually did with them. As can be seen in the graph, Dorsey's worst year was 2013. He produced nine fewer points than what was expected with the draft capital that he had. To put this in context, this is one superstar level player (nine points) or three role players (three points each). Dorsey's best year was in 2015 when he produced two more points than was expected. When combining all the years together, Dorsey's draft picks were expected to produce 147 points in value but only produced 127 points. This means that he underperformed on his draft picks by a value of 20 points.

Grades Based on Round



In the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, and 6<sup>th</sup> rounds of the draft, Dorsey has been consistent in averaging around the projected value of his picks. He has had the best results in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round, overperforming the projected value of picks by a total of one point. The rounds that Dorsey has struggled the most with are the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> rounds, with the 5<sup>th</sup> being his worst. In the 5<sup>th</sup> round he lost a total of seven points from the projected value.




The value of knowing this information is that future predictions can be made based on his history. The way this predictive outcome graph works is that it charts the average projected outcome vs the results for each round. For example, 3<sup>rd</sup> round picks are projected to generate three points of value. This graph shows us that on average Dorsey’s draft picks underperform this by .22 points, meaning Dorsey’s 3<sup>rd</sup> round picks should have a projected value of 2.78 instead. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> round, Dorsey’s best round, he is outperforming the




This predictive outcome graph is like the previous one, but this is used for offensive positions instead of draft rounds. This graph shows that RB, WR, TE, and G will most likely outperform and QB, FB, T, and C will most likely underperform their draft position.

*Defensive*



Dorsey’s results when drafting defensive players have not been as impressive compared to his offensive results. The only position where he has outperformed the projected value is DT. All the other positions on the defensive side of the ball he has underperformed. The positions with which he has had the worst overall results are CB and DE/EDGE, underperforming each by nine points. LB has almost been as bad, underperforming projections by eight points. Dorsey defensive picks have had a total projected value of 71 points but only resulted in 48 points. This means that he has underperformed on his defensive selections by a total of 23 points.




The predictive outcome model shows us that the value of Dorsey's defensive picks should all have a negative projected draft value except DT. His worst position, DE/EDGE picks, are predicted to underperform their draft spots projected outcome by 1.8 points.

## Steals


Steals are players that generated at least two points of value.

### *Biggest Steal*




The player that has generated the most value of all Dorsey's picks is WR Tyreek Hill. Hill was selected in the 5<sup>th</sup> round with the 165<sup>th</sup> pick. The 165<sup>th</sup> pick has a projected value of two points, but Hill has resulted in eight points. The value gained from this pick is six points, or the equivalent of a 1<sup>st</sup> round 6-15 pick. The ironic thing about this is that the 5<sup>th</sup> round is historically Dorsey's worst round; if he had not picked Hill, his 5<sup>th</sup> round grade would have been much worse.

*Best Steal Offensive*



The offensive player (excluding Hill) that has generated the most value of all Dorsey picks is TE Travis Kelce. Kelce was selected in the 3<sup>rd</sup> round with the 63<sup>rd</sup> pick. The 63<sup>rd</sup> pick had a projected value of 4 points, but Kelce resulted in 8 points. The value gained from this pick is 4 points, or the equivalent of a 2<sup>nd</sup> round pick.

*Best Steal Defensive*



The defensive player that has generated the most value of all Dorsey picks is DT Chris Jones. Jones was selected in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round with the 37<sup>th</sup> pick. The 37<sup>th</sup> pick had a projected value of 4 points, but the Jones pick resulted in 8 points. The value gained from this pick is 4 points, or the equivalent of a 2<sup>nd</sup> round pick.

*Other Notable Steals*


1<sup>st</sup> Round: QB Patrick Mahomes, 2<sup>nd</sup> Round: RB Nick Chubb, 6<sup>th</sup> Round G Zach Fulton and G Laurent Duvernay-Tardif

**Busts**

Busts are players that resulted in the team losing at least two points of value.

*Biggest Bust*


There was a three-way tie for this award, so I selected the player of the three that I deemed the worthiest.




The player that was the biggest bust of Dorsey’s was CB KeiVarae Russell. Russell was selected in the 3<sup>rd</sup> round with the 74<sup>th</sup> pick. The 74<sup>th</sup> pick has a projected value of three points, but the Russell pick resulted in zero points. The reason that the graph for Russell is blank is because he never played a snap for the Chiefs. He was waived after being inactive for his one and only game as a Chiefs player.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2663632-keivarae-russell-waived-by-chiefs-latest-comments-and-reaction>

*Biggest Bust Offense*



The offensive player that was the biggest bust of Dorsey picks is T Eric Fisher. Fisher was selected in the 1<sup>st</sup> round with the 1<sup>st</sup> pick. The 1<sup>st</sup> pick of the 1<sup>st</sup> round has a projected value of seven points, but the Fisher pick resulted in four points. The value lost from picking Fisher was three points, or the equivalent of a 3<sup>rd</sup> round pick. It can be easily argued that Dorsey did the best that he could in this situation. Fisher was selected in the 2013 NFL draft, which is one of the worst drafts of all time. Fisher took some time to develop, but eventually turned into a solid contributor for the Chiefs. Fisher has developed into a very good NFL player, but he did not live up to the expectations that come with being the 1st overall pick.

*Biggest Bust Defense*

The defensive player (excluding Russell) that was the biggest bust of Dorsey picks is DE Chad Thomas. Thomas was selected in the 3<sup>rd</sup> round with the 67<sup>th</sup> pick. The 67<sup>th</sup> pick had a projected value of three points, but Thomas resulted in zero points. Thomas was waived after two years with the Browns.<sup>7</sup>

*Other Busts*

1<sup>st</sup> Round: EDGE Dee Ford, 2<sup>nd</sup> Round: CB Greedy Williams and DE Tanoh Kpassagnon, 4<sup>th</sup> Round: WR Jehu Chesson, 5<sup>th</sup> Round: LB Mack Wilson, QB Kevin Hogan, QB Aaron Murray, LB D.J. Alexander, LB Ukeme Eligwe, 6<sup>th</sup> Round: CB D. J. White

<sup>7</sup> <https://dawgpounddaily.com/2020/09/05/cleveland-browns-release-chad-thomas/>

## Draft Trends

Every GM has positions that they think are the most important to their team. The draft is a great place to find these players and start grooming them. The Draft Trends graph shows what positions Dorsey has used the most draft picks and the value of the draft picks used. The red line is the total number of draft picks that he has picked at each position.



### Volume of Picks

Dorsey has used the greatest number of picks, per position, on CB. Dorsey has made a total of 54 draft picks and of those 54, has used nine on CB (17%). The next most popular position for Dorsey is WR, using seven draft picks at that position (13%). Of the main positions he has invested the fewest number of draft picks into are TE, T, C, and DT. He has used two picks on each of these positions (4%).

### High Picks Used by Position


Dorsey has used the most 1st round picks on QB and CB; two each (33% of 1st round picks for each of the positions). Of the top 100 picks that Dorsey has used, CB has the greatest number with six picks (27% of top 100 picks). DE/EDGE and RB are tied for second in top 100 draft picks used, he has selected both positions three times each (14% of top 100 picks). S is the only main position that Dorsey has not used a top 100 pick on.

### Draft Trend Observations

Based on Dorsey's history, there are a few patterns that emerge. CB and QB are the most important positions to him. If he has a 1<sup>st</sup> round pick, he is most likely to use it on one of those two positions. CB is the most important non QB position to him, he has picked CB more than any other position in the top 100 and has drafted that position the most overall times (nine). Dorsey values the WR and LB position but prefers to wait until later in the draft to select those positions. He has selected WR seven times, but only once in the top 100. He has selected four LB 7 times, twice in the top 100. When Dorsey drafts a QB he either drafts them in

the 1<sup>st</sup> round or waits until the later rounds of the draft, he has not drafted a QBs in 2<sup>nd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> rounds. He prefers to draft RB after the 1<sup>st</sup> round but in the top 100, he has selected three of his four RBs in this area.

Dorsey's drafting pyramid represents the positions that he places the most amount of value (top) on to the least (bottom).



## Summary

### *Strengths*


- Rounds 1-3
  - Dorsey has proven that he is able to identify and draft high-end talent in the first three rounds of the draft.
- Offensive
  - Dorsey has been especially good at drafting offensive players.
- 1st round QBs
  - Dorsey has drafted two QB's in the top 10, both have been a success.

### *Weakness*

- Later rounds
  - He has struggled with finding role players in the later rounds of the draft. He has had some excellent picks in these rounds but has missed on several picks. He seems to prefer to take players with high upside and low floors, rather than solid role players with low ceilings and high floors that are less likely to bust.
- Defensive
  - Dorsey has struggled when picking defensive players.
- DE/EDGE
  - DE/EDGE players are the position that Dorsey has been the least successful at drafting.

## Review

The goal of this section is to grade Dorsey’s performance in the draft. Below are his draft scores by year, also including his overall grade. Dorsey has proven himself to be a very capable scout and has done very well in the draft. Most GMs would be very happy to have done as well as him. His success in the draft has been a key factor in the rebuilding of the Chiefs and Browns rosters.



Year	Pts	Grade
2013	-9	D-
2014	1	A
2015	2	A+
2016	2	A+
2017	-5	C
2018	-4	C+
2019	-7	D+
Overall	-2.86	B

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# SECTION 3: FREE AGENCY

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## Overview

The purpose of this section is to analyze the effectiveness of Dorsey when signing free agents. This section will only include players that were signed as a free agent or claimed off waivers. The only exception to this is contracts that were signed by franchise tagged players. They are technically not free agents, but many top tier players get tagged before signing new contracts. The main areas that will be examined to grade the signing are effective APY (average per year) salary, level of performance, and availability. Effective APY salary is defined as the average per year that a player counts against a team's salary cap. The reason for using this is that it accounts for the dead cap after some players are cut.

Free agency is one of the marquee events for any organization or GM. Fans want to see their teams sign big ticket free agents and fill holes that they see in their team. FA is a vital tool for every GM but one that should be used with caution.

Every offseason there are dozens of signings by every organization. To best analyze the effectiveness of Dorsey in free agency I will be separating the free agent contracts into four categories: Superstar, Starter, Role Player, and Bench Player. Superstar will include all contracts that have an APY (average per year) greater than 7.5% of the salary cap in the year that they are signed. Starter will include all contracts that have an APY greater than 4% but less than 7.5%. Role players will be all contracts with an APY of greater than 1.5% but less than 4%. Bench players are players that sign for less than 1.5%.

Contract Categories	
<b>Superstar</b>	7.5% +
<b>Starter</b>	4% - 7.5%
<b>Role Players</b>	1.5- 4%
<b>Bench Players</b>	0-1.5%

Each contract will be graded on a scale so that they can be evenly compared. When using the grading scale, a grade of A means that a player far surpassed the contract that they signed, and the team gained immense salary cap benefits from having that player on their team. B means that the player outperformed their contract and that the team received a salary cap benefit from having the player on their team. C means that the player lived up to their contract but did not surpass it or add any additional salary cap benefits to the team based on the contract. D means that the player underperformed their contract, and the team could have paid someone less money to get the same results that the player gave them. This leads to a negative salary cap return. F means that the player underperformed their contract extremely and the team would have been much better off by not resigning the player.

A very important thing to remember is that the contracts are what are being graded, not the players. Meaning that the player's performance is being measured directly against their contract. Players that sign a bigger contract will have to have a bigger impact to justify that contract. For example, a player that signs a contract in the superstar range will need to perform on a superstar level to achieve an average contract score. In contrast, if a player signs a contract in the Role Player range, their contract could be graded as an excellent contract by them playing at a starter level.

There are countless stats that can be looked at and different tools used to analyze a player's performance. To achieve the goal of being able to evenly compare players across every position, the main metric that we will be using is comparing the players PFF (Pro Football Focus) grade against the number of snaps played. The two reasons for doing this is that PFF's grades consider all aspects of their play, and they are a neutral grading site. Players are also graded on the same scale, meaning they can be compared across positions. Adding the snap counts to the PFF grade paints a more complete picture. If a player has a high PFF score but played very few snaps, the score is less relevant. By putting both numbers into one graph, trends emerge that enable us to analyze a player's impact on the team.

PFF Grading Scale	
<b>Elite</b>	90-100
<b>High Quality</b>	80-89.9
<b>Average</b>	70-79.9
<b>Below Average</b>	60-69.9
<b>Replaceable</b>	0-59.9

## Superstar Level Contact

The Superstar level contracts are defined as contracts that have a projected APY greater than 7.5% of the salary cap in the year that they are signed. Superstar contracts are unique because organizations give very few of them out in comparison to the other level of contracts.

When a team gives out a Superstar contract, it is always because the player has a very strong record of past performance. Because of this, all the graphs below have been set up in a similar way. Year -2 and -1 are the player's previous two years before they sign their superstar contract, year one is the year that they sign the contract, and years two and three are the two years after. The goal of doing it this way is that GMs are expecting these players to maintain a similar level of performance after they sign as they did before signing. These graphs will show us how their performance changed.


### Dwayne Bowe

#### Contract

In 2012 the chiefs signed WR Dwayne Bowe to a five-year, \$56 million/\$11.2 million APY contract. This contract was the 3rd highest WR contract at the time that it was signed.<sup>8</sup> Bowe went on to play only two years of this contract before being released. Of the possible \$56 million he earned \$24.2 million and had an effective APY of 12.1 million.<sup>9</sup>

#### Performance

Bowe had a PFF grade average of 82.7 before signing his contract and a 73.25 average after. This drop is the equivalent of going from a high quality player to being average. His snap count did remain very consistent. Before his new contract he averaged 821 snaps per year and averaged 852 after.



#### Review

Signing Bowe to a contract that made him the 3<sup>rd</sup> highest player was a mistake. Bowe was a good player before signing this contract, but he was not great. If he would have maintained the same level of performance this contract could have been defended. However, there was a large drop off in his performance thus shining a large spotlight on this contract. His age could have played a role in his performance since he was 29 when he signed this contract. Many players start regressing around 30, which happened with Bowe. Based on the size of the contract, the large dip in player grade, and the fact that Dorsey cut him after only two seasons on this contract -- this was a bad contract. Cutting Bowe left a lot of dead money behind, but his effective APY was \$12.1 per year making this contract far from catastrophic.

*Contract Grade: D+*

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/dwayne-bowe-signs-56m-deal-with-kansas-city-chiefs-0ap1000000146842>

<sup>9</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/dwayne-bowe/503/>


### Justin Houston

#### Contract

In 2015 the chiefs signed OLB/EDGE Justin Houston to a six-year, \$101 million/\$16.8 million APY contract. This was the largest contract ever given to a linebacker, but since the Chiefs ran a 3-4 defense Houston spent most of his time rushing the passer.<sup>10</sup> This contract made him the second highest paid defensive player in the NFL, ranking right behind Ndamukong Suh.<sup>11</sup> Houston went on to play four out of the six years on that contract before being released with an effective APY of \$17 million.<sup>12</sup>

#### Performance

Houston had a PFF Average of 90.3 in the two years before signing his contract and 82 average the three years after. This change is the equivalent of dropping from an elite level player to a high quality level. He also had injury trouble after signing this contract, his snap count dropped from an average of 901 before to 677 per year after.



#### Review

When Houston was signed to this contract, he was arguably one of the best players in the NFL. In 2014 he had recorded 22 sacks, which almost broke the single season record.<sup>13</sup> He also was only 26 years old, which is usually right at the prime of a player's career. However, there is a stark contrast between his performance before and after signing his new contract. His performance fell dramatically, and his snap count went down considerably. A lot of this could be related to injuries but fans will probably never know what happened. He played four of the six years of his contract with an effective APY of \$17 million. The Chiefs gave Houston a

<sup>10</sup> <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2430825-justin-houston-contract-latest-news-and-rumors-on-negotiations-with-chiefs>

<sup>11</sup> [https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/\\_/id/13260695/kansas-city-chiefs-sign-justin-houston-landmark-deal](https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/13260695/kansas-city-chiefs-sign-justin-houston-landmark-deal)

<sup>12</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/justin-houston/517/>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.pro-football-reference.com/players/H/HousJu00.htm>

huge contract to be an elite level player, instead he was just above average. Based on the size of his contract, the dip in his performance and snap count this contract was a bad one for the Chiefs.

*Contract Grade: D+*


*Jeremy Maclin*

*Contract*

In 2015 the chiefs signed WR Jeremy Maclin to a five-year, \$55 million/\$11 million APY contract.<sup>14</sup> This contract placed Maclin within the range of top 10 highest paid WR. In 2013 he tore his ACL in the preseason and missed the remainder of the year.<sup>15</sup> Because of this, we will only be taking the year prior to his new contract into account for his averages. Maclin was cut after two years into his five-year contract having an effective APY of \$11.5 million.

*Performance*

Maclin had a PFF grade of 80.6 the year prior to signing his new contract, after his contract he had an average of 71.4. This means that his performance dropped from being a high quality player to becoming average. His snap count also dipped; it went from being 1030 before to averaging 787 after. Maclin dealt with several injuries while with the chiefs, which lead to him missing several games.



*Review*

A major reason that Maclin did not have more success with the chiefs was the injury problems. With the contract that Dorsey gave Maclin he was betting on him staying healthy, like the prior year to signing him, but that is not what happened. As seen in the graph both his PFF grade and snap count dropped in each subsequent year. Maclin's contract has a lot of similarities to the contract the Chiefs gave Dwayne Bowe.

<sup>14</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy\\_Maclin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Maclin)

<sup>15</sup> <https://sportsinjurypredictor.com/player/jeremy-maclin/17>

Both were graded as high-end starts when they signed but regressed quickly, both signed 5-year contracts but were cut after two years, and both were overpaid for their performance. Bowe was able to stay healthy with the Chiefs and Maclin made less money. The two differences somewhat balanced the different contracts out. There are very few positives with the contract that the Chiefs gave Maclin and because of this the contract is graded as a bad contract.

*Contract Grade: D*

*Eric Berry*

#### *Contract*

In 2017, the Chiefs signed SS Eric Berry to a six-year, \$78 million/\$13 million APY contract. This contract made Berry the highest-paid safety in the NFL.<sup>16</sup> In the previous season Berry was assigned the franchise tag but held out almost all the offseason wanting a long-term contract before signing the franchise tag. Berry was cut after playing two of the six years of this deal, having an effective APY of \$14.95 million.<sup>17</sup>

#### *Performance*

Berry had an average PFF grade of 84.6 and averaged 1153 snaps per year prior to signing his contract. After signing this massive contract Berry's PFF grade and snap dramatically changed. He had an average PFF grade of 64.4 and only averaged 133 snaps per year after. This means that Berry went from playing at a high-quality level to becoming below average immediately after signing his contract. Even more impactful is that not only did his level of play drop, but his snap count dropped almost by 90% as well. In his first season on this contract Berry tore his Achilles in the season opener of 2017 and missed the rest of the season.<sup>18</sup> Fans still do not know what happened to him the next season, he was listed day to day almost the entire season because of a bone spur and played very little.<sup>19</sup>


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<sup>16</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric\\_Berry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Berry)

<sup>17</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/eric-berry/504/>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/reid-eric-berry-possibly-tore-achilles-will-have-mri-0ap3000000840732>

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/chiefs-safety-eric-berry-dealing-with-heel-deformity-0ap3000000967505>



*Review*

Berry was a great player and has an amazing story as part of the chief’s organization, but this contract was terrible from the start. Berry’s contract can be considered nothing else other than a catastrophic failure and might have even been a reason that Dorsey was fired. To put his contract into perspective the Chiefs paid Berry almost \$30 million to play 266 snaps at a backup player level.

*Contract Grade: F*

*Jarvis Landry*


*Contract*

In 2018, the Brown signed WR Jarvis Landry to a five-year, \$75.5 million/\$15.1 million APY contract, making him the sixth highest paid receiver in the NFL.<sup>20</sup> Landry is still playing for the Browns and about to enter the fourth year of this contract.

*Performance*

Landry had an average PFF grade of 82.5 before signing his contract and a 79.2 grade after. According to PFF he graded and still grades out as a high-quality level. His snap count has also remained consistent, going from averaging 940 before his contract to 915 after. As seen by the graph Landry has been a very consistent player for the Browns, maintaining his previous levels of production after signing his new contract.

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/browns-wr-jarvis-landry-signs-five-year-extension-0ap3000000926126>



### Review

There is nothing to say that is negative about this contract. Landry has performed almost identically from before he signed his new contract as he did after signing it. Most of the snaps he missed were COVID related so they should even be counted against him. The only argument that can be made against this contract is that he should not have been paid as the sixth highest receiver. This might be true, but the contract seems to follow the trend of what players get paid when they get new contracts. WR contracts have continued to go up considerably since Landry signed this contract making the amount, he makes very reasonable. This is exactly what every team hopes to get out of a player after signing them to a superstar level contract. This was a good contract for the Browns and a good contract for Landry. It is unknown at this time if he will complete this contract. Even if he is released/traded there will be minimal negatives for the Browns.

*Contract Grade: B*

## Starter Level Contracts

Starter level contracts are defined as contracts, when signed, that have a projected APY (average per year) value of between 4% and 7.5% of that season’s salary cap. Players that are signing contracts in this range should be expected to be full-time starters and play a significant role on the team.

Like with the Superstar contract levels year -2 and -1 will be the player performance the previous two years before signing the new contract. Year one is the year they signed the contract and years two and three are the two years after.


*Sean Smith*

### Contract

In 2013 the Chiefs signed CB Sean Smith to a three-year, \$18 million/\$6 million APY contract.<sup>21</sup> Smith played all three years of this contract.

### Performance

Before signing with the chiefs Smith had an average PFF grade of 57.9 and after signing with them he had an average of 76. He improved from being graded as a replaceable level player according to PFF (the lowest category) to an average level player. As the graph shows his PFF grade was similar in the first year of this contract to his performance before signing with the Chiefs. After the first year his performance significantly increased, and he averaged a PFF grade of 80.6 in those two seasons. His snap count also stayed consistent going from averaging 1055 per year to 1027.



### Review

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/sean-smith-k-c-chiefs-have-three-year-18m-contract-0ap1000000150699>

Everything about this contract worked out great for the chiefs. His play improved, his snap count stayed consistent, and his contract was very team friendly. He outperformed his contract by playing at a much higher level than the salary that he earned.

*Grade: A+*


*Mitchel Schwartz*

### *Contract*

In 2016, the chiefs signed RT Mitchell Schwartz to a five-year, \$33 million contract/\$6.6 million APY contract. This contract made him one of the highest-paid right tackles in the NFL.<sup>22</sup> Schwarz played the five years of this contract and even signed a one-year extension (but was released before playing that year).

### *Performance*

Before signing with the chiefs Schwartz was averaging a PFF grade of 75.8 and after signing had an average of 77 in the first three years. His snap count averaged 1082 before the new contract and 1113 after. Schwarz checked all the boxes that Chiefs wanted when they signed him, he continued to play at an average player level and did not miss snaps. While playing for the Chiefs he was even named an All-Pro four times.



### *Review*

This contract is elite because Schwartz continued his high level of play, and his cap numbers were extremely team friendly. Right tackles have always been paid less than left tackles, but this gap has been shrinking considerably in the last few years. Dorsey was able to identify that the NFL is changing, and that RT was being underpaid in relation to their value. Even though Dorsey paid Schwartz at the top of the RT market Schwartz level of play more than justified this. This contract was a homerun for the Chiefs.

<sup>22</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitchell\\_Schwartz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitchell_Schwartz)

Grade: A+


### Tamba Hali

#### Contract

In 2016 the chiefs signed OLB Tamba Hali to a 3 year, \$22 million/\$7.3 million APY contract.<sup>23</sup> He was released after the second year of this contract and had an effective APY of \$7 million.<sup>24</sup>

#### Performance

Before signing this contract Hali had an average PFF grade of 77.9 but dropped to an below average grade of 68.4 after signing this contract. He was also averaging 946 snaps per year before and that dropped to 358 after.



#### Review

When the chiefs signed Hali, he was 32 and the size of the contract suggest that they foresaw him going from being a full-time player to a situational pass rusher. Unfortunately, Hali's performance and availability immediately declined, and he did not live up to this contract. His first year was decent but nothing about this contract can be viewed as a positive. It deserves the bad grade that it has earned.

Grade: D-

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.profootballrumors.com/2016/03/chiefs-to-re-sign-tamba-hali>

<sup>24</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/tamba-hali/531/>


### Derrick Johnson

#### Contract

In 2016, the Chiefs signed LB Derrick Johnson to a three-year, \$21 million/\$7 million per year contract.<sup>25</sup> The Chiefs were able to renegotiate his contract so that he was paid less in the second year of his contract (year 4 in graph). The final year of his contract was voided due to contract language.<sup>26</sup> After everything, Johnson had an effective APY of \$6.625 million per year in those two years that he played.

#### Performance

In 2014 he only played in one game because he tore his Achilles, because of this, we will not use that season in grades or snap counts. Before signing this contract, he had a PFF grade of 85.2 but averaged a PFF grade of 67.8 after. His snap also declined, going from 1184 snaps in 2015 down to the average of 867 after.



#### Review

Johnson was 32 years old when he signed this contract, which probably played a large role in his decline. This contract was probably slightly better than the contract that the chiefs gave Hali because he was able to maintain a decent level of snaps, albeit at a replacement level of play. Overall, there are not any positives that came out of this contract for the Chiefs.

*Grade: D*

<sup>25</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derrick\\_Johnson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derrick_Johnson)

<sup>26</sup> [https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/\\_/id/18931437/kansas-city-chiefs-reach-pay-cuts-derrick-johnson-anthony-sherman](https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/18931437/kansas-city-chiefs-reach-pay-cuts-derrick-johnson-anthony-sherman)


*Bennie Logan*

*Contract*

In 2017 the Chiefs signed DT Bennie Logan to a one-year deal worth \$8 million. He played the one-year for the Chiefs and the Chiefs did not re-sign him.

*Performance*

Before signing the contract, Logan was averaging a PFF grade of 66.9 and had a grade of 63.5 in the one year with the chiefs. His snap count averaged 523 before and was 617 with the chiefs. He was rated as a below average level player before signing and played at the same level after.



*Review*

They paid him a few million more than he was worth but when signing players to a one-year contract players usually get a higher salary. The money could have been spent in a better place, but the chiefs lost Dontari Poe that year and maybe thought that they needed Logan to fill the gap for a year. His performance took a dip compared to the average of the previous two seasons, but it was still similar while playing a few more snaps.

*Grade: C*

*T.J. Carrie*


*Contract*

In 2018, the Browns signed CB T.J. Carrie to a four-year, \$31/\$7.75 million per year contract. Carrie only lasted for two years on this contract before being released. His effective APY was \$8 million per year.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/t-j-carrie/3158/>

### Performance

Before signing with the Browns, Carrie had an average PFF grade of 71.1. After signing with them, he had an average grade of 63. His snap count went up from averaging 701 per year to 792. As the graph shows Carrie's snap count was dropping before he was released. The reason for this is that other CB on the team were passing him on the depth chart and taking more snaps. When looking at his PFF grade, it is very apparent that his performance just was not good enough. In his first year on this contract, he averaged 66.9 score which is a below average level and in his second he averaged a 59.2 which places him in the replacement category.



### Review

This contract was very bad for the Browns and generated little value. The Browns were wise to cut him after two years. The year before signing with the Browns Carrie had a good year and Dorsey must have thought that Carrie was a starter level player -- which was not the case.

Grade: D-

*Chris Hubbard*

### Contract


In 2018, the Browns signed RT Chris Hubbard to a five-year, \$37.50 million/\$7.5 million APY contract.<sup>28</sup> This contract put Hubbard in the pay range of the top 10 starting RT salaries. Hubbard is still playing for the Browns, but he did renegotiate his contract in 2020 to take a pay cut. Before taking the pay cut, he had an effective APY salary of \$7.73 million per year.<sup>29</sup>

### Performance

<sup>28</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris\\_Hubbard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Hubbard)

<sup>29</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/chris-hubbard/2708/>

Before signing with the Browns Hubbard had averaged a PFF grade of 68.1 and went on to average a grade of 62.5 after signing his new contract. He averaged playing 599 snaps per game before and 757 after signing. The graph for Hubbard does a great job of showing what most likely happened with Hubbard. Dorsey watched his 2017 tape and thought that Hubbard could be a starting RT. When he came to the Browns instead of improving on his play he declined. The Browns decided he was not good enough to be the starter and his playing time declined because they moved him into a backup role.



### Review

He was not good enough to be a starter and cost too much to be their swing tackle. In 2020 the Browns made Jack Conklin the highest paid RT to replace him. Hubbard appears to have found his role as offensive line depth and is now being paid in that range. Offensive line depth does not need to be paid the amount that Hubbard was making.

*Grade: D*

*Sheldon Richardson*

### Contract


In 2019, the Browns signed DT Sheldon Richardson to a three-year, \$36 million/\$13 million APY contract. He played two of the three years of his contract before being released. After being released his effective APY was \$12.45 million per year.<sup>30</sup>

### Performance

Before signing with the Browns, he had been averaging a PFF grade of 70.9 and averaged 71.3 after. His snap count increased from 687 per year to 847. His PFF ranking has him staying consistently around the low-end

<sup>30</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/sheldon-richardson/2194/>

average level. Richardson performed very similarly after signing his contract as he did before and played quite a few more snaps.



*Review*

Richardson being cut in the final year of his contract was not expected by most. There was only a small amount of dead money when they cut him so the way the contract was set up was a positive for the team. Overall, I do not see any negatives in this contract other than maybe the Browns paid Richardson a little more than he was worth.

*Grade: C*

## Role and Bench Players Level Contracts

Role Player level contracts are defined as contracts that have a projected APY of less than 4% but greater than 1.5% of the salary cap in the year that they are signed. Bench player contracts are for players that are signed that have a projected APY of less than 1.5% of the salary cap in the year that they are signed.

Role and bench player contracts are most of what GM's sign players to. In any given year GM's will sign several role players and dozens of bench players. The reason for so many bench players is that teams can have up to 90 players on their offseason roster. Teams bring in a lot of players that they think might have some potential to compete in camp. This process for teams is like looking for a needle in a haystack. It is rare to find a player that makes a difference on the team. When they find a player that does, it is beneficial to the team because these players have small salaries.

Rather than evaluating all these players and transactions, I will just focus on the moves that Dorsey made that had a significant positive impact on the team. When looking at players that made in the 2-4% range, most of those contracts were either average or bad. These players are being paid to be role players, so the expectations are very low for them. The same is even more true for players being paid on minimum contracts. Instead of analyzing all these moves, I will just focus on the ones that made a significant impact on the team.

The graphs for these players will not include any previous years played before they were signed by the Chiefs. Year one will be the first year they were on the Chiefs and any years after that pertain to their time with the Chiefs.


### Ron Parker

#### Contract

In 2013 the Chiefs claimed Ron Parker off waivers from the Seattle Seahawks.<sup>31</sup> Parker played out his two-year, \$1.2 million/\$600,000 APY contract with the Chiefs before resigning with them in 2015. The Chiefs signed him to a five year, \$25 million/\$5 million APY contract.<sup>32</sup> He was released from that contract after three years and earned an effective APY of \$4.5 million.<sup>33</sup>

#### Performance

In his first year with the Chiefs Parker was just a role player but he performed very well in his limited snaps (89.8 PFF grade). In his second year he took over the starter role playing 1021 snaps. He only graded out at a 63.8 according to PFF which is a below average player level. He was able to dramatically improve his play in the next two years (three and four) averaging a PFF grade of 71.7 (average level). His performance really dropped off in year five, cratering all the way to a PFF score of 57.3. He was released after that season.



#### Review

There are a few reasons that Parker's time with the Chiefs should be highlighted as a positive for Dorsey. The first is that Parker had bounced around the league quite a bit and Dorsey identified his potential and claimed him off waivers. The next is that the Chiefs got tremendous value out of his first two years that he was on the team. His five year, \$5 million per year contract did not generate as much value for the Chiefs but he outperformed his contract in the first two years of this contract before struggling in his 3<sup>rd</sup> year before being

<sup>31</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20160725210423/http://www.chiefs.com/news/article-2/Chiefs-Announce-Roster-Transactions/eeaa57a3-fa04-48cf-9fcf-956d0599aa51>

<sup>32</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/ron-parker/1889/>

<sup>33</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/ron-parker/1889/>

cut. The effective APY of \$4.5 million for those three years was a positive for the Chiefs and did generate value for them.

Grade: B+


*Husain Abdullah*

*Contract*

In 2013 the Chiefs signed Husain Abdullah in 2013 to a 1 year, \$640,000 contract.<sup>34</sup> The Chiefs re-signed him after that year to a 2 year \$2.275 million/\$1.14 million APY contract. Abdullah played all three years with the Chiefs before retiring.

*Performance*

In his first year with the Chiefs, he had a PFF grade of 79.2 while playing 341 snaps. In the next two years he had an average PFF grade of 71.9 while playing an average of 759 snaps per year. As seen by his PFF grade Abdullah was a very consistent player for the Chiefs. When called upon to be a starter in year two he graded out at 72.7 which is an average level player.



*Review*

Abdullah proved to be extremely valuable to the Chiefs and helped them maintain their high level of play through Eric Berry’s fight against cancer. What really stands out about this signing for Dorsey is that Abdullah had taken the previous year off before signing with the Chiefs. Dorsey did a great job of seeing that Abdullah had talent and giving him a shot. Everything about Abdullah’s contracts brought immense value to the Chiefs, he was paid very little in contrast to his level of play.

Grade: A

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/kansas-city-chiefs/husain-abdullah-4641/transactions/>

### Albert Wilson

#### Contract

In 2014, the Kansas City Chiefs signed Wilson who was UDFA to a three-year, \$1.54 million/\$513,333 APY contract. After his third year the Chiefs placed a one year \$1.78 million tender on him to play a fourth year, since he was a RFA (restricted free agent).<sup>35</sup>

#### Performance

Wilson had an average PFF grade of 64.5 and played an average of 522 snaps per year. Wilson's best year came in his fourth year averaging a PFF grade of 73.8 while playing 593 snaps.



#### Review

Very rarely do UDFA signings turn into anything more than a camp invite and then the player being released during roster cuts. This is a rare example of a player that not only made the roster but played meaningful snaps and had a positive impact. Wilson's time for the Chiefs was not spectacular but contracts like these are what let teams invest in the top of their rosters.

*Grade: A*

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/miami-dolphins/albert-wilson-14949/transactions/>


### Terrence Mitchell

#### Contract

Terrence Mitchell was signed, released, and placed on the practice squad by several teams including the Chiefs. Mitchell played for the Chiefs for two years from 2016-2017. During those two years with the Chiefs, he earned approximately \$900,000/\$450,000 per year.<sup>36</sup>

#### Performance

Mitchell had an average PFF grade of 68.9 and played an average of 500 snaps per year when he was with the Chiefs.



#### Review

Mitchell only started for part of his second year as a Chiefs, but he is exactly what teams try to find when they sign players to low-cost contracts. When he was needed, he proved to be a competent player and was even able to start when he was called upon.

*Grade: A*

<sup>36</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/terrence-mitchell/3193/>


### Terrence Mitchell

#### Contract

In 2018, the Browns signed Terrence Mitchell to a three-year, \$12 million/\$3.33 APY contract.<sup>37</sup> He played all three years of the contract and was not re-signed by the Browns.

#### Performance

Mitchel was very consistent for the Browns and had an average PFF grade of 65. While playing meaningful snaps the first two seasons, Mitchell played 1225 snaps in his third year and averaged a 68.2 grade.



#### Review

Mitchell was signed to a small three-year contract, but it proved to be very valuable to the Browns. In the first two years of the contract Mitchell played around the level of his contract, but in his third year he proved to be extremely valuable to the Browns playing 1225 snaps and maintaining a decent level of play.

*Grade: A*

<sup>37</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrance\\_Mitchell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrance_Mitchell)


### Kareem Hunt

#### Contract

In 2019 the Browns signed Kareem Hunt to a one year, \$1.1 million contract. He only earned \$596,471 of that contract since Hunt was suspended that season for eight games for violating the league's domestic violence policy forfeiting the rest.<sup>38</sup> Because of this contract and the amount of the time that Hunt had been in the league the Browns were able to assign a second-round tender to Hunt and retain him the next year at \$3.25 million (Dorsey was not the one to do this having been fired).

#### Performance

Hunt performed great for the Browns having a PFF grade of 76.7 while playing 309 snaps in the first year and then grading at 74.4 the next while playing 606 snaps.



#### Review

Hunt's issues off of the field were a big concern, but Dorsey was very familiar with Hunt and gave him a second chance. Hunt proved to be very valuable for the Browns and they generated a lot of value from his contracts.

#### Grade: A

#### Other Notable Signings

A couple other contracts worth mentioning, but not going into too much depth, are Ryan Harris, Geoff Schwartz, and Spencer Ware. Harris and Schwartz were both signed to very small one-year contracts and both outperformed their contract and gave the chief stability along their line for the year they were there. Spencer Ware had a few years where he really contributed to the Chiefs while not making much money.

<sup>38</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/kareem-hunt/5672/>

Summary

Dorsey has signed a total of 33 contracts in the superstar, starter, and role player contract ranges. He has signed a significant number of bench player contracts. While it is too timely to mention them all, I will focus on a few important ones. There are four contracts that I identified in the bench player pay range that made significant contributions to his teams. When going through all the snaps and grades for the bench player contracts there was a considerable number of players that he brought in that made a small contribution that benefited his teams greatly. The number of contracts that Dorsey has in all three contract ranges shows an even distribution that is beneficial for roster construction, 15% superstar, 24% starter, and 61% role player.



When looking at the rankings for all the contracts that he has signed a bell curve does appear but it is leftward facing because of all the D level contracts.



*Final Grade**Strengths*

- Finding players on bench level contracts to play a small role on the team
- Identifying the market underpaying the RT position and signing an excellent RT

*Weakness*

- Paying older players
  - He signed several players that production dropped off after signing them, most of these players were older
- Signing superstar players
  - Superstar contracts rarely turn out to be great contracts for the team, but Dorsey's superstar players overall underperformed.

*Best Contract: Mitchel Schwartz*

*Worst Contract: Eric Berry*

Free Agent Contract Size	Grade
Superstar	D
Starter	C
Role Player	C
Bench Player	B
Overall	C-

# SECTION 4: EXTENSIONS


## Overview

A smaller role of the GM is giving out contract extensions to the players that are currently under contract. Since these players are already a part of the team, they extend the amount of time the player will play for the team, usually at a higher salary.

Dorsey's extensions will be broken into four categories, Superstar, Starter, Role Player, and Minor. Superstar will include all contracts that have an APY (average per year) greater than 7.5% of the salary cap in the year that they are signed. Starter will include all contracts that have an APY greater than 4% but less than 7.5%. Role player will be all contracts with an APY of greater than 2% but less than 4%. Bench Player salaries are players that sign for less than 2%.

Contract Categories	
<b>Superstar</b>	7.5% +
<b>Starter</b>	4% - 7.5%
<b>Role Players</b>	1.5- 4%
<b>Bench Players</b>	0-1.5%

Dorsey has signed a total of 19 contract extensions.



## Superstar

*Alex Smith*

### Extension

In 2014, Dorsey signed QB Alex Smith to a four-year \$68/17 million APY contract extension.<sup>39</sup> Smith was playing in the final year of his contract when he signed the extension. Smith played for the Chiefs for three years of this extension before being traded to the Redskins.

### Performance



The year before signing his extension Smith had a PFF grade of 69.8 and played 1064 snaps. After signing his extension, he had a PFF average of 75.4 and 1017 snaps per year.

### Review

Smith was never a superstar player while playing for the Chiefs, but he was solid and reliable. His contract was very fair for Smith and the Chiefs. His average yearly salary put him around in the 10-15 highest paid QB pay range.


*Grade: A*

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transactions/2014/kansas-city-chiefs/signed-extension/>

## Eric Fisher

*Extension*

In 2016, Dorsey signed LT Eric Fisher to a four-year \$48/12 million APY contract extension.<sup>40</sup> The Chiefs picked up Fisher's 5<sup>th</sup> year option before signing him to this extension. Fisher played for the Chiefs for three years of this extension before being released in the final year due to him tearing his achilles in the playoffs.

*Performance*

The year before signing his extension (-2) Fisher had a PFF grade of 77.7 and played 1078 snaps. After signing his extension, in the year that was his 5<sup>th</sup> year option (-1), he had a PFF grade of 69.7 and played 1017 snaps. He averaged a PFF grade of 75.5 and 1003 snaps per year on his extension (1-3).

*Review*

Fisher was a very consistent and reliable player for the Chiefs. The amount of money that he was paid was very fair to both Fisher and the Chiefs. His average yearly salary placed him on average between the 8-15 highest paid LT pay range.

*Grade: A*

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transactions/2016/kansas-city-chiefs/signed-extension/>


## Starter

*Allen Bailey*

### *Extension*

In 2014 Dorsey signed DE Allen Bailey to a 4-year \$25/6.25 APY million extensions.<sup>41</sup> Bailey was playing in the final year of his contract when he signed the extension. Bailey remained on the Chiefs for the entirety of the extension.

### *Performance*



Bailey never had a very high PFF grade before or after he signed his extension. Dorsey might have been betting on him improving but, outside of a few years, his performance was poor during his time with the Chiefs. To justify this contract Bailey should have averaged around a 70 PFF grade but instead his average was 63 and he missed the majority of 2016 with an injury.

### *Review*

The Chiefs probably thought Bailey brought more value to the team than the grade PFF gave him, if not they would not have kept him around for his entire contract. His contract was also more reasonable as time passed since Bailey's was slightly above the starter contract threshold the year he signed. Bailey never performed up to a starter level and at best should have been considered an average role player on the team.

*Grade: D*


<sup>41</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transactions/2014/kansas-city-chiefs/signed-extension/>

### Jamaal Charles

#### Extension

In 2014 Dorsey signed RB Jamaal Charles to a 2 year \$18.1/\$9 million APY contract extension.<sup>42</sup> Charles had two years left on his current contract but threatened to hold out, so Dorsey gave him the extension to make him happy. This extension put him in the top 5 of RB contracts.<sup>43</sup> Charles was cut in 2016.

#### Performance



Charles was 28 when he signed his extension which is right before the age running backs begin to decline. Charles declined almost instantly though because of injuries. He tore his ACL in 2015 and never recovered.

#### Review

There is nothing positive about this extension for the Chiefs. Yes, the chiefs might have been worse if Charles held out, but he still had two years left on his deal and he was 28.

*Grade: F*

<sup>42</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transactions/2014/kansas-city-chiefs/signed-extension/>


<sup>43</sup> <https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/jamaal-charles-holdout-chiefs-contract-fantasy-football-training-camp-houston-alex-smith/obta4rqd130510nl7ihhf8sh2>

Travis Kelce

Extension

In 2016 Dorsey signed TE Travis Kelce to a 5 year \$46/\$9.2 APY million contract, making him the second highest paid TE.<sup>44</sup> Kelce was playing in the final year of his contract when he signed the extension. Kelce played out the entire extension and signed another one with the Chiefs in 2020.

Performance and Review



Kelce has been an elite TE and has performed better than the Chiefs could have ever hoped. This was an excellent deal for Dorsey. Not only has Kelce performed at a very high level, he has also been very reliable.

Grade: A+


<sup>44</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transactions/2016/kansas-city-chiefs/signed-extension/>

### Laurent Duvernay-Tardif

#### Extension

In 2017 Dorsey signed G Laurent Duvernay-Tardif to a 5-year \$42.4/\$8.5 million contract extension.<sup>45</sup> Tardif was playing in the final year of his contract when he signed the extension. This extension made him one of the highest paid G in the league.<sup>46</sup>

#### Performance



Tardif has struggled since signing the extension. His PFF grade had an average PFF grade of 70 in the first three years of his career and averaged 820 snaps per year. After signing the extension, he has struggled with injuries and opted out of playing in 2020 because of COVID.

#### Review

Dorsey must have thought that Tardif was going to be a solid anchor for the Chiefs offensive line for years to come when he signed him to the contract extension. If Tardif was still performing at the levels that he had been before the extension, this contract would have been very good since the market for G has gone up rapidly since this contract. Tardif has not and his injury history has to be concerning to the Chiefs.

*Grade: F*

<sup>45</sup> <https://www.sportrac.com/nfl/transactions/2017/kansas-city-chiefs/signed-extension/>


<sup>46</sup> <https://arrowheadaddict.com/2017/02/27/laurent-duvernay-tardif-chiefs-contract-rumors-guard/>

### J.C. Tretter

#### Extension

In 2019 Dorsey C J.C. Tretter to a 3 year \$32.5/\$10.8 million APY contract extension.<sup>47</sup> Tretter was playing in the final year of his contract when he signed the extension. This extension put him in the top 5 of highest paid C in the league.<sup>48</sup> Tretter still has two years remaining of this extension.

#### Performance



Since signing this extension, Tetter has maintained a high level of play and average snap level. In the first year of the extension Tretter's PFF score improved to 81 ranking him as the 2<sup>nd</sup> best center in the league in 2020.

#### Review

Tretter has been a great player for the Browns and if he continues his level of play this should be remembered as a great extension by Dorsey.

*Grade: A*

<sup>47</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transactions/2019/cleveland-browns/signed-extension/>

<sup>48</sup> <https://www.cleveland.com/browns/2019/11/jc-tretter-signs-his-3-year-extension-with-the-browns-he-embodies-all-the-qualities-you-look-for-says-gm-john-dorsey.html>

## Role and Bench Player

### *Summary*

Dorsey signed four players to role player contracts and eight to bench player contracts. Of those twelve, there is one that really stood out as a bad extension.

### *Duke Johnson*

In 2018 Dorey signed RB Duke Johnson to a 3-year \$15.6/5.2 APY million contract extension. Dorsey then traded him the next year. This extension cost the Browns \$4.25 million but did net them a draft pick.

## Summary

When Dorsey signs extensions they are either great for the team or they are a complete miss. Of the two F's in the starter level the only one that he really deserved was the Jamaal Charles contract. He should not have extended Charles when he held out. The F grade for the Tardif contract is the result of injuries and COVID that have led to a decrease in snaps and performance.



### Strengths

- He did an excellent job of extending his superstar level players
- He has an eye on future roster/cap ramifications. He extended all these players with one year left on their contracts

### Weakness

- Giving in to Charles hold out and giving him a new contract
- He can be overly aggressive in giving out extensions, like in the case of Johnson and Charles

Contract Extension Size	Grade
Superstar	A
Starter	C
Overall	B-

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# SECTION 5: TRADE

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## Overview

The purpose of this section is to analyze the effectiveness of Dorsey when making trades. This section will examine what was given up and what was received in each trade, as well as the salary cap ramifications.

When grading the trade of draft picks, they will not include the players picked at those positions. The players drafted with those picks by Dorsey or by the other GM will not factor into the trade grade. Draft results are examined under the Draft section, this being the Trade section will only examine the outcome of the trades made.


When players are involved in a trade, the impact of the player on the field and their contract will be examined to rate the trade. If a player was traded and then signed a new contract, only the traded contract will be included in the trade grade. This is because the new contract will either be graded under the section Free Agent or Extensions. GM's might have a new contract already in the works when they trade for players but when they make the trade with the opposing team, they are only receiving the contract that the player is signed to.

The trades made by Dorsey will be broken down into sections based on the type of trade that was made. The sections are picks for player, players for picks, player for player, combo, and draft day trades. The trades will then be subdivided into one of four categories based on the magnitude of the trade: Large, Medium, Small, Micro. Large trades either include superstar/star level players or the equivalent of a 1<sup>st</sup> round draft pick value. Medium either include star/role player level player or the equivalent of a 2<sup>nd</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup> round draft pick value. Small include role players or 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> round draft pick value. Micro trades are when players did not make an impact on the team, or the net draft pick return was a 7<sup>th</sup> round draft value or less.

The trade value chart in the Appendix will be used to adjust and compare trade values. Draft picks that are traded in the future will be weighted at 80% of their value.

### Picks for Player

Dorsey has traded picks for players a total of seven times. The most common trade is Micro followed by Medium.




### Large

### Trade

In 2013, Dorsey traded away the Chiefs 2013 2<sup>nd</sup> round pick (34<sup>th</sup> overall) and 2014 2<sup>nd</sup> round pick (56<sup>th</sup> overall) to the 49ers for QB Alex Smith.<sup>49</sup> The trade was originally for a 2014 3<sup>rd</sup> round pick, but the Chiefs won nine games meeting the conditional requirement to upgrade the pick to a 2<sup>nd</sup> round pick.<sup>50</sup> The value of these two picks combined were roughly equivalent to an 8<sup>th</sup> pick in the draft. Alex Smith had two years remaining on his contract at \$8 million APY a year.

### Performance

Smith was named the Chiefs starter after the trade and had an average PFF grade of 71.4 in the first two years (low end starter). Smith's performance remained consistent with his previous two years before the trade, aside for his snaps increasing (due to being injured the last year with the 49ers).



### Review

After his first year playing for the Chiefs, Dorsey signed Smith to a four-year extension, and he played for the Chiefs for five years before being traded.<sup>51</sup> QB is the most important position in the NFL. Smith brought stability to a position that was unstable for the Chiefs the past several years. Trading away the equivalent of the 8<sup>th</sup> overall pick was a very high price to pay for Smith, but Dorsey correctly identified that Smith was the best QB the Chiefs could get that offseason and made it happen. Smith had a very friendly team contract which also was a positive for the Chiefs (2 years, \$8 million APY). Smith went on to be a cornerstone in the Chiefs' rebuilding process and set the foundation for their future success.

### Trade Grade: B

<sup>49</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/kan/2013\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/kan/2013_trades.htm)

<sup>50</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014\\_Kansas\\_City\\_Chiefs\\_season](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Kansas_City_Chiefs_season)


<sup>51</sup> <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2182963-alex-smiths-contract-extension-is-the-perfect-deal-for-the-kansas-city-chiefs>

*Medium**Trade*

In 2018, Dorsey traded away the Browns 4<sup>th</sup> round pick (123<sup>rd</sup>) and 2019 7<sup>th</sup> round pick (234<sup>th</sup>) to the Dolphins for WR Jarvis Landry.<sup>52</sup> The value of these two picks combined equaled the 85<sup>th</sup> pick (mid-3<sup>rd</sup> round) in the draft. Landry had been franchised tagged by the Dolphins and was on a one year \$15.98 million contract.<sup>53</sup>

*Performance*

Landry became the top receiver on the Browns after this trade and had an average PFF grade of 76.5 in the first two years (starter). Landry's performance took a slight dip from his previous two seasons with the Dolphins, dropping from a PFF average of 82.2 to 76.5 (pro bowl to starter) but his snap remained consistent.

*Review*

After trading for Landry, Dorsey signed him to a five-year extension, which he is still playing on.<sup>54</sup> Trading for a player signed to a franchise tag is not ideal since they are only signed to one year and at a high cost. However, Dorsey only gave up the equivalent of a 3<sup>rd</sup> round pick which was very reasonable. Landry has been very successful with the Browns and became one of their offensive cornerstones.

*Trade Grade: A*

<sup>52</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2018\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2018_trades.htm)

<sup>53</sup> <https://overthecap.com/player/jarvis-landry/3002/>


<sup>54</sup> <https://www.nfl.com/news/browns-wr-jarvis-landry-signs-five-year-extension-0ap3000000926126>

### Trade

In 2018, Dorsey traded the Browns 3<sup>rd</sup> round pick (65<sup>th</sup> overall) to the Bills for QB Tyrod Taylor. Taylor had 1 year left on his contract and had a cap hit of \$16 million.

### Performance

Taylor was named the starter but only played in the first three games before getting injured and then losing the starting job. Taylor was averaging a PFF grade of 76.7 (starter) before being traded but his PFF grade dropped to 47 after (replacement).



### Review

Everything about the trade was great for Dorsey. They only gave up a 3<sup>rd</sup> round pick for a starting QB on a one-year contract making an average salary. Even if the Browns did not re-sign him after that year, it was likely that they would recoup part of the trade in a compensatory pick for him leaving. Taylor had been a solid starting QB for the Bills, but his play did not transfer over to his time in Cleveland. Dorsey also drafted Baker Mayfield with the 1<sup>st</sup> overall pick in the draft which probably played a role in him losing the starting job. Overall, Taylor was a huge disappointment for the Browns and made a significant salary in his one year in Cleveland.


*Trade Grade: F*

*Small**Trade*

In 2015 Dorsey traded a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick (154<sup>th</sup> overall) to the Saints for G Ben Grubbs.<sup>55</sup> Grubbs had two years \$12 million/\$6 APY remaining on his contract.<sup>56</sup>

*Performance*

Grubbs was named the starting LG but was injured in week seven and put on IR.<sup>57</sup> Before being traded to the Chiefs, Grubbs had an average PFF grade of 76.8 (starter) and had averaged 1210 snaps per year. In his one year in Kansas City Grubbs had a PFF grade of 67.5 (backup) and only played in 459 snaps.

*Review*

In the previous two seasons before Dorsey traded for Grubbs, Grubbs had been a pro bowl/starter level player. Looking at the trends the reason the Saints probably traded Grubbs away was most likely because he was 31-years old, and his performance was starting to decline. He also was on a decent sized contract for a Guard. Trading a 5<sup>th</sup> round draft pick for a starting G is very reasonable since it would be unlikely to find a starting guard in the 5<sup>th</sup> round. His age and contract size does downgrade the upside of this trade for the Chiefs. The Chiefs did not give up much but had to take on Grubb's contract. This trade provided little value to the Chiefs since Grubbs only played about half a season at a backup level.

*Trade Grade: D*


<sup>55</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015\\_Kansas\\_City\\_Chiefs\\_season](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Kansas_City_Chiefs_season)

<sup>56</sup> <https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/kansas-city-chiefs/ben-grubbs-1093/>

<sup>57</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben\\_Grubbs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Grubbs)

## Players for Picks

Dorsey has traded players for pics a total of 12 times. The most common trade is Micro followed by Small.



In 2019 Dorsey traded RB Duke Johnson to the Texans for a 3<sup>rd</sup> round pick (74<sup>th</sup> overall). Johnson's contract had three years and \$11.25/\$3.8 million APY remaining and left \$2.25 million in dead money behind.

### Review

There is more going on with this trade since Dorsey signed Johnson to an extension before trading him. However, from just a trade perspective, Dorsey did very well with this trade. The downside to this trade is the 2.25 million in dead money. The Browns no longer needed Johnson since they drafted RB Nick Chubb and signed RB Kareem Hunt. The upside is that they were able to get back a valuable pick, 74<sup>th</sup> overall in the 3<sup>rd</sup>, and moved Johnson's contract off the books. Johnson was a solid level starter during his time with the Browns according to PFF, but he was more of a rotational back never having over 600 snaps in a season. Johnson maintained around the same level of play for the Texans, but they cut him after two seasons. The moral of the story is that any time a GM can make a trade with Bill O'Brian, they should not let that opportunity pass them by. The Browns would have probably been lucky to get a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick from another team.

*Trade Grade: A*

*Small**Trade*

In 2015 Dorsey traded S Kelcie McCray to Seahawks for 2016 5th round pick (162<sup>nd</sup>).<sup>58</sup> Kelcie had one year \$610,000 left on his contract and left \$100,000 in dead money behind.

*Review*

McCray was mostly just a special team's contributor for the Chiefs, so getting a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick back for him was a pretty good value since it is possible the Chiefs might have just cut him. McCray did play some for the Seahawks, so the trade worked out for both teams.

*Trade Grade: A*

*Trade*

In 2018 Dorsey traded Jamar Taylor to Cardinals for a 6th round pick (187<sup>th</sup>).<sup>59</sup> Taylor had approximately two years and \$10/\$5 APY left on his contract after being traded and cost the Browns \$2 million in dead money when traded.

*Review*

It is unclear what role Taylor would have had for the Browns in 2018, he was cut in his first season with the Cardinals after they traded for him. Getting a 6<sup>th</sup> round pick for him was a very good value and he did nothing for the Cardinals before cutting him.

*Trade Grade: A*

*Trade*

In 2018 Dorsey traded RB Carlos Hyde to the Jaguars for a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick (144<sup>th</sup> overall).<sup>60</sup> Hyde played part of the season for the Browns but had approximately three years and \$10.9/\$3.7 million APY left on his contract and left \$4.3 million in dead money behind.

*Review*

Hyde was signed to pair with RB Duke Johnson but became unnecessary after drafting RB Nick Chubb. Getting a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick for a player that was just signed is a very good return in this situation. The Browns also saved \$1.2 million in 2018 by trading Hyde. Hyde did little for the Jaguars and was cut after the season. Dorsey was fortunate to be able to trade Hyde and dump his salary while still getting a pick in return. While this trade is

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<sup>58</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/kan/2015\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/kan/2015_trades.htm)

<sup>59</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2018\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2018_trades.htm)

<sup>60</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2018\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2018_trades.htm)

rated as an A, the Browns would have been better off not signing Hyde and having his dead money on their salary cap.

*Trade Grade: A*

*Trade*

In 2019 Dorsey traded LB Genard Avery to the Eagles for a 4<sup>th</sup> round pick (110<sup>th</sup> overall). Avery was traded in the middle of the season and had three years and \$1.97 million/\$657,255 APY remaining and left the \$485,000 in dead money behind.

*Review*


Avery was a rotational player with the Browns in his first year but had been inactive for most of 2019. His PFF grade was replacement level. While he did improve on his PFF grade with the Eagles, he played very few snaps. Avery was a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick in 2018, so getting a 4<sup>th</sup> round pick in exchange for him one year later seems like good value. This is especially true when considering he had been placed on the inactive list for the Browns for most of the season. There is no downside for the Browns in this trade and they were able to get back a good return for the level of player Avery was.

*Trade Grade: A*

*Trade*

In 2019 Dorsey traded G Austin Corbett to Rams for a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick (169<sup>th</sup>). Corbett had 3 years \$3.2/ \$1 million APY remaining and left \$3 million in dead money behind.

*Review*



Corbett had been the 33<sup>rd</sup> pick in 2018 and had played for the Browns one year before being traded. Corbett did not do anything with his time with the Browns but turned things around with the Rams. He played significant snaps in both seasons. He has played for the Rams and improved his PFF score significantly in

2020. Dorsey believed in Corbett when he drafted him but gave up too early on him. Not only did they only get a 5<sup>th</sup> round pick back for him, they also had \$3 million left in dead money after this trade.

*Trade Grade: F*


## Player for Player

*Large*

*Trade*

In 2019 Dorsey traded G Kevin Zeitler for DE Oliver Vernon of the Giants.<sup>61</sup> Zeitler had three years, \$32/10.7 million APY left on his contract and left \$7.2 million in dead money behind. Vernon had three years, \$31.3/15.6 million APY left on his contract and left \$8 million behind in dead money. Both players were being paid in the top five of their positions at the time of the trade (RG and DE).

*Review*




Since both were getting paid in the top five of their position the contract values will be considered a wash. They both played for their new teams for two years as Zeitler was released after the second year. Vernon did take a pay cut to remain on the team for the last year of his contract. As can be seen in the graphs, both players' PFF scores dropped considerably. However, their snap counts did remain constant. Both teams were probably content with the trade since they moved on from players that they did not deem valuable anymore and were getting paid a very high salary. In the end, both players underperformed the contracts that they were signed to. I would give the edge to the Browns in getting a more valuable position, but Zeitler did not have injury problems which balances the trade back out.

*Trade Grade: C*

<sup>61</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2019\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2019_trades.htm)

*Small**Trade*

In 2013 Dorsey traded CB Javier Arenas to Cardinals for FB Anthony Sherman.<sup>62</sup> Both were on rookie contracts, had small salaries, and left little dead money behind in the trade.

*Review*

Arenas played the season for the Cardinals but had very little impact and was not re-signed. Sherman played the two years remaining on his contract and signed several extensions to remain playing for the Chiefs a long time. Sherman had an average PFF grade of 86 in his first two years and averaged 334 snaps a year. The FB position is of little value in the NFL, but Sherman has outperformed what was given up for him in this trade.


*Trade Grade: A*

<sup>62</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/kan/2013\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/kan/2013_trades.htm)

### Trade

In 2013 Dorsey traded DE Emmanuel Ogbah to Chiefs for S Eric Murray.<sup>63</sup> Both were in the final year of their rookie contracts, had small salaries, and left little dead money behind in the trade.

#### Review



Both players played the one year left on their contract and did not re-sign with the team that traded for them. Both sustained injuries and did not play the entire season. The slight edge goes to the Chiefs in this one because Ogbah improved his PFF performance 13 points in his one season with them. Not to mention, DE is a more valuable position than S. Uniquely enough, both players generated comp picks for their team when they left.

*Trade Grade: C*

<sup>63</sup> [https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2019\\_trades.htm](https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/cle/2019_trades.htm)

## Combo


*Big*

*Trade*

In 2019 Dorsey traded S Jabrill Peppers, 17<sup>th</sup> pick, and 95<sup>th</sup> pick for WR Odell Beckham Jr. Peppers had two years \$3.2/\$1.6 APY remaining on his contract with a 5<sup>th</sup> year option. He left behind \$2.8 million dead money behind. Beckham had five years \$74/\$14.8 million APY remaining on his contract and left \$16 million dead money behind.

### Review

The 17<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> pick are equivalent to trading the 5<sup>th</sup> overall pick according to the trade value chart.



Dorsey gave up a massive amount of assets to trade for Beckham. The one advantage for the Browns in this trade is that the Giants had to take on \$16 million in dead money vs the \$2.8 million the Browns had. When looking at the PFF grades for both players have regressed quite a bit from the year before they were traded. Peppers had a PFF grade of 77.6 the year before the trade but has averaged a PFF grade of 64.5 after. Beckham had a PFF grade of 90 the year before the trade but has averaged a PFF grade of 72 after. When looking at the graphs both teams should have taken the previous two years into account because that is much closer to the level of performance, they have both achieved since the trade. Peppers has played quite a few snaps but has been a disappointment for the Giants with his average PFF score of 64.5 which is below average play. Beckham has also been a disappointment for the Browns, while he has a higher average PFF score than Peppers, it is not much better at 72 which is average play. Beckham was also injured and missed a large portion of the 2020 season. If you break this trade into two parts, Jabrill Peppers and the 95<sup>th</sup> pick for Odell Beckham Jr, and the 17<sup>th</sup> pick for the Giants losing \$13.2 million in cap space, then it makes it easier to process. Overall, the Giants have done much better in this trade since Beckham has underperformed his expectations. Until Beckham improves, this trade turned out poorly for the Browns

*Trade Grade: F*


Medium

Trade

In 2018 Dorsey traded QB DeShone Kizer and a 4th (101st) and 5th round pick (138th) to Packers for S Damarious Randall and a 4th (114th) and 5th round pick (150th). Kizer had three years \$2.7/\$1.4 million APY left on his contract and left \$1.3 million dead money behind. Randall had one year \$1.5 million left on his contract and left \$1 million dead money behind.

Review

The draft picks had minimal impact so this trade can be viewed as basically a player for player swap.



From looking at the above charts, it is very apparent that the Browns won this trade. Kizer was cut by the Packers after just one season and the Browns picked up Randall’s 5<sup>th</sup> year option so that he would play an extra year for them. Randall was the starting safety for the Browns for two years averaging a PFF grade of 71 which is average play.

Trade Grade: A+


*Small*

*Trade*

In 2020 Dorsey traded a 5th round pick (155) and 6th round pick (188th) to the Bills for G Wyatt Teller and 2021 7th round pick (257th). Wyatt had three years \$2 million/\$660,000 APY left on his contract and left \$190,000 dead money behind.

*Review*

According to the draft chart it cost the Browns approximately the 114<sup>th</sup> (4<sup>th</sup> round) pick to trade for Teller.




In the Draft section, the 114<sup>th</sup> pick is estimated to have a PFF grade over 50 and average 100 snaps per year and generate two points of value. As you can see from this chart, Teller is outperforming the estimated return of the 114<sup>th</sup> pick by quite a bit. Teller is averaging a PFF score of 74.5 with an average of 692 per season since the trade. According to the draft chart, that means that Teller has generated five points of value. Tellers’ performance has grown astronomically in his second year on the Browns. On top of this, he was graded out as an elite level player. If he has another year like 2020, this trade will become even more lopsided for the Browns.

*Trade Grade: A+*

## Draft Day Trades

### *Trade Ups*

It is always very costly for a GM to trade up in the draft. Since GMs are trading up to target a specific player in the draft, that player's results will also be considered. Dorsey traded up a total of six times.



#### *Large*

- 2017 1st round pick (27th), 3rd round pick (91st) and 2018 1st round pick (22<sup>nd</sup>) to Bills for 1st round pick (10th).

Gave up the equivalent of a late 1st round pick to move up 17 spots in the 1st round (according to draft value chart).

#### *Medium*

- 2017 3rd round pick (104th), 4th round pick (132<sup>nd</sup>) and 7th round pick (245th) to Vikings for 3rd round pick (86<sup>th</sup>).

Gave up the equivalent of a late 3rd round pick in value to move up 18 spots in the 3rd round.

#### *Small*

- 2019 2nd round pick (49th) and 5th round pick (144th) to Colts for 2019 2nd round pick (46th).

Gave up the equivalent of a 5th round pick to move up 3 picks in the 2nd round.

- 2018 4th round pick (114th) and a 6th pick (178th) to Patriots for 2018 4th round pick (105th) .

Gave up the equivalent of an early 6th round pick to move up 9 spots to the early 4th round.

- 2015 3rd round pick (80th) and 6th round pick (193<sup>rd</sup>) to Vikings for 2015 3rd round pick (76th).

Gave up the equivalent of a late 6th round pick to move up four spots in the 3rd round.


*Micro*

- 2017 5th round pick (170th) and 5th round pick (180th) to Vikings for 4th round pick (139th).

Gave up the equivalent of a 7th round pick in value to move up around 31 picks to the late 4th round.

*Trade Downs*

Trading down in the draft is usually a very popular thing among analysts and sometimes fans. Trading down is not always an option though because there must be someone that wants to trade up to do this. Dorsey has traded down a total of three times, mostly preferring medium trade downs.

*Medium*

- Gained the equivalent of an early 3rd round pick to move down nine picks to the 2nd round.

2016 1st round pick (28th) to 49ers for 2nd round pick (37th overall), 4th round pick (105th) and 6th round pick (178th overall).

- Gained the equivalent of a late 3rd round pick to move down 15 picks into the 3rd round

2016 2nd round pick (59th overall) to Buccaneers for 3rd round pick (74th overall) and 4th round pick (106th overall)

*Small*

- 2018 2nd round pick (64th overall) to Colts for 3rd round pick (67th overall) and 6th round pick (178th)

Gained the equivalent of an early 6th round pick to move down 3 picks into the 3rd round


*Draft Day Trades*

When it comes to the trade value chart, it is almost always good when a GM trades down and bad when they trade up. Instead of rating each of these trades, the patterns that he follows when making draft day trades will be identified.


- Dorsey averages a 1.3 draft trades per year in the draft
- Dorsey prefers to trade up (6) rather than trade down (3)
- Dorsey prefers to trade down in the earlier rounds (1-2) and up in the middle rounds (3-4)

## Summary

Dorsey has completed a total of 45 trades. His favorite type of trade to make is trading a player for a pick, 27%, followed closely by a combo trade, 24%.



Something that is very interesting about Dorsey is that he makes a high number of micro trades. They account for 45% of the trades that he makes. Most of these trades involve him trading off fringe roster players for either a pick or packaged with a pick to move up in the draft.



## Final Grade

### Strengths

- Getting trade value out of fringe roster players in the form of late round picks or small trade ups
- Trading off players that he does not want anymore
- Understanding the league and NFL Draft and not being overly aggressive or trading up too often

### Weakness

- None

*Best Trade:* 5th round pick (155) and 6th round pick (188th) to the Bills for G Wyatt Teller and 2021 7th round pick (257th)

*Worst Trade:* S Jabrill Peppers, 17<sup>th</sup> pick, and 95<sup>th</sup> pick for WR Odell Beckham Jr.

Trade Type	Grade
Picks for Players	C+
Players for Picks	B+
Player for Player	B
Combo	B-
Trade Up/Trade Down	B
Overall	B

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# SECTION 7: SUMMARY

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## Chiefs

Dorsey spent five years with the Chiefs and was a key contributor to turning the organization around. In the five years prior to being hired as the GM, the Chiefs had been 26-55. In the five years with Dorsey, they were 53-27. In the five years prior to Dorsey, the Chiefs had won their division once and been to the playoffs once, losing in the wild card round. With Dorsey, they won their division twice, went to the playoffs four times, and won one playoff game.

Before Clark Hunt hired Dorsey, he hired Andy Reid to be the head coach. The power structure of the Chiefs organization was Dorsey and Reid having roughly equal power. They reported to Hunt instead of the historical model of the coach reporting to the GM. It is hard to determine what impact each played in the Chiefs rebuild, but it is certain that they could not have done it without working together.

In the middle of the offseason, Hunt announced that Reid had been given a five-year extension. Dorsey was informed that he would not receive an extension and parted ways with the Chiefs.<sup>64</sup>

### *Reason for Firing?*

- Dorsey had believed that they had a shot at winning a Superbowl and had been going all in the last few years to do so. Because of this, he had been re-signing older players to bad contracts. He was trying to keep everyone together. That Superbowl window had been closed with the drafting of Patrick Mahomes and a new one was opening that would be centered around Mahomes. The Chiefs were in a transition period, and they decided Dorsey would be a part of that transition.
- His relationship with Reid had become strained and Hunt decided that keeping Reid happy was more important than keeping Dorsey around.
- They had recently lost Chris Ballard to the Colts, and they really liked Brett Veach and did not want to lose him too. Instead of waiting for another team to try and take him away, they decided to open their GM spot for him.
- Eric Berry contract

### *Final Thoughts*

Dorsey was a key reason that the Chiefs organization went from a team who's ceiling was making the playoffs to a team contending for the Superbowl. The biggest change that Dorsey brought to the Chiefs was the ability to find QBs. A main reason that the Chiefs turned around so quickly under Dorsey and Reid was Alex Smith's play at QB. The chiefs had not had a QB as good as him since Trent Green. Dorsey not only traded a top five all-time chiefs QB, he also drafted one months before he was released. Since the Dorsey firing, the Chiefs

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<sup>64</sup> <https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/chiefs-part-ways-with-gm-john-dorsey-extend-andy-reids-contract>

have won a Superbowl and been to another. Mahomes has been the key to this, and Dorsey was the guy that picked him. The Chiefs organization and fans should be eternally grateful to Dorsey. He was one the key pieces that turned their franchise from one of little importance to one of the most dominant franchises in the NFL. When Dorsey took over as the GM for the Chiefs, he inherited a below average roster. In contrast, when Veach took over he inherited one of, if not, the best rosters in the NFL.

Chiefs GM	Grade
<b>Draft</b>	B+
<b>Free Agency</b>	D
<b>Trades</b>	B
<b>Extensions</b>	B-
<b>Overall</b>	B-

## Browns

Dorsey was hired to be the GM of the Browns after being fired as the Chiefs GM. Dorsey was the GM for the Browns for two years before being fired. In the two years prior to being hired as the GM, the Browns had been 1-31. In the two years with Dorsey, they were 13-18-1. In that four-year time span Browns never made a playoff appearance before or after Dorsey was hired.

When Jimmy Haslam hired Dorsey, Hugh Jackson was already the head coach of the Browns. The power structure of the Browns is not exactly clear, but Dorsey did not have complete control over the coaching staff. In his first year as GM Haslam and Dorsey fired Jackson and replaced him with interim head coach Greg Williams. During that offseason, the Browns decided to hire Freddie Kitchens to be their new head coach. Kitchens was the head coach for one disappointing season before being fired by the Browns. Dorsey was fired two days later.<sup>65</sup>

### *Reason for Firing?*

- Supporting the hiring of Freddie Kitchens as Head Coach
- Taking a job with the Browns

### *Final Thoughts*

In an ESPN interview after being hired as the Browns GM, said, "I'll come straight out with it, the guys who were here before (the previous front office), and that system they didn't get real players".<sup>66</sup> It is rare in this era of football to get such an honest response, but Dorsey meant what he said. In his two years as the GM, he made 26 trades, five times the number of trades he made in his first two seasons with the Chiefs. He signed 12 new players to contracts in the superstar-role player range, four more than his first two years with the Chiefs. Of the 22 starting players from the previous year only eight retained their job. Dorsey made a major

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2019/12/31/21044776/browns-fire-john-dorsey-jimmy-haslam>

<sup>66</sup> <https://www.dawgsbynature.com/2017/12/14/16779436/browns-gm-john-dorsey-says-browns-dont-have-enough-real-football-players-and-other-notes>

shakeup of the roster. The organization quickly learned that part of the problem was Hugh Jackson, who was later fired in the middle of the first season.

When comparing his grades from his time with the Chiefs and Browns, Dorsey had better results with his time with the Chiefs. One of the reasons for this is that the coaching staff was much better and more stable. There was very little turn over with the Chiefs. The Browns coaching staff was a revolving door. They had a total of three head coaches in his two years with them. This makes it much harder for the players that Dorsey brings in to succeed. Players are usually drafted to fit within the coaching scheme or to fill a certain role. When there is constant turnover, it makes everything much harder for the players. They must learn new playbooks, etcetera. The coach must then figure out how to get them to fit within their system. The other reason that his moves graded higher with the Chiefs is that he was not trying to completely rebuild the roster with the Chiefs. Dorsey was basically trying to rebuild the entire Browns' roster in the first year. There are a limited number of free agents every year, and there are only so many teams wanting to trade off a player. Dorsey planned to rebuild the Browns' roster with quantity. Some of that quantity did not perform as well as their contracts or trades had suggested they would.

When Dorsey took over as the GM, he inherited the worst roster and coaching staff in the league. In contrast, when he left, he left an above average roster and no coaching staff. If Dorsey had been the one that hired Freddie Kitchens to be the head coach, his firing would have been justified. Dorsey was only partly responsible for his hiring, and as such he does not deserve the full blame. However, the blame for Dorsey's firing does fall squarely on himself. He accepted a job from Jimmy Haslam. Haslam bought the Browns in 2012. Since then, he has fired six head coaches and 5 GMs. That means he is firing, on average, a head coach or GM every 290 days. GMs specifically, on average, only last 638 days. Dorsey made it 754 days, surpassing that average.

<b>Browns GM</b>	<b>Grade</b>
<b>Draft</b>	C
<b>Free Agency</b>	C
<b>Trades</b>	B
<b>Extensions</b>	B
<b>Overall</b>	C+

## Final Grades

From a production standpoint, John Dorsey was an effective GM for both the Chiefs and the Browns. From a nonproduction view, teams might have not been a fan of his personality or his tendency to bring players in that had off the field concerns. Dorsey is an old-school GM. He is a good scout, trusts his gut, and has lots of NFL connections. Any NFL team looking for a GM should give Dorsey a legitimate shot. If he could be paired with a front office that understands the data side that the NFL is taking, and he finds a culture that he fits in, Dorsey could revitalize another NFL team.

### *Key Trait*

- Alpha Mentality: Trusts his abilities
- Wants to Win: Does not try to play it safe, wants to succeed more than worried about failing
- Gambler: Looks for high risk, high reward players
- Blind Eye: Overlooks players off the field concerns because of their potential

### *Biggest Strengths*

- Identifying and bringing in QB talent
- First two rounds of the draft
- Finding hidden gem players in the later rounds
- Understanding the NFL landscape, for trades and the draft
- NFL connection and the ability to make trades

### *Biggest Weaknesses*

- Signing players for what they have accomplished and not what they will accomplish
  - Example: Signing older players with the Chiefs
- Betting early on players and giving them contracts they don't always deserve
- Trying to make every pick in the later rounds a home run instead of finding quality depth
- Finding defensive talent in the draft
- Having good rapport
  - Leaving a voicemail letting Jeremy Maclin know that he was cut

GM	Grade
<b>Draft</b>	B-
<b>Free Agency</b>	C-
<b>Trades</b>	B
<b>Extensions</b>	B-
<b>Overall</b>	B-

# APPENDIX

## Fitzgerald-Spielberger NFL Draft Trade Value Chart

Pick	Value														
1	3000	33	1228	65	885	97	682	129	537	161	425	193	333	225	255
2	2649	34	1213	66	877	98	676	130	533	162	422	194	330	226	253
3	2443	35	1198	67	869	99	671	131	529	163	419	195	328	227	251
4	2297	36	1184	68	862	100	666	132	526	164	416	196	325	228	249
5	2184	37	1170	69	854	101	661	133	522	165	412	197	323	229	246
6	2092	38	1157	70	847	102	656	134	518	166	409	198	320	230	244
7	2014	39	1143	71	840	103	651	135	514	167	406	199	318	231	242
8	1946	40	1131	72	833	104	646	136	510	168	403	200	315	232	240
9	1887	41	1118	73	826	105	642	137	507	169	400	201	312	233	238
10	1833	42	1106	74	819	106	637	138	503	170	397	202	310	234	235
11	1785	43	1094	75	812	107	632	139	499	171	394	203	307	235	233
12	1741	44	1082	76	805	108	627	140	496	172	391	204	305	236	231
13	1700	45	1071	77	799	109	623	141	492	173	388	205	302	237	229
14	1663	46	1060	78	792	110	618	142	489	174	386	206	300	238	227
15	1628	47	1049	79	786	111	613	143	485	175	383	207	298	239	225
16	1595	48	1038	80	779	112	609	144	481	176	380	208	295	240	223
17	1564	49	1028	81	773	113	604	145	478	177	377	209	293	241	220
18	1535	50	1018	82	767	114	600	146	474	178	374	210	290	242	218
19	1508	51	1007	83	761	115	595	147	471	179	371	211	288	243	216
20	1482	52	998	84	755	116	591	148	468	180	368	212	285	244	214
21	1457	53	988	85	749	117	587	149	464	181	366	213	283	245	212
22	1434	54	979	86	743	118	582	150	461	182	363	214	281	246	210
23	1411	55	969	87	737	119	578	151	457	183	360	215	278	247	208
24	1389	56	960	88	731	120	574	152	454	184	357	216	276	248	206
25	1369	57	951	89	725	121	570	153	451	185	354	217	274	249	204
26	1349	58	942	90	720	122	565	154	447	186	352	218	271	250	202
27	1330	59	934	91	714	123	561	155	444	187	349	219	269	251	200
28	1311	60	925	92	709	124	557	156	441	188	346	220	267	252	198
29	1294	61	917	93	703	125	553	157	438	189	344	221	264	253	196
30	1276	62	909	94	698	126	549	158	434	190	341	222	262	254	194
31	1260	63	900	95	692	127	545	159	431	191	338	223	260	255	192
32	1244	64	892	96	687	128	541	160	428	192	336	224	258	256	190