The impact of GM job security on decision-making in the cap carryover era

The job description of an NFL general manager lends itself to contradiction. On one hand, a GM is responsible for keeping both the present and future of the franchise in mind when making decisions. But GM’s know that if they aren’t successful today then they won’t be around for the future.

This past offseason, six teams—the Eagles, Falcons, Bears, Redskins, Dolphins and Jets—either hired a new GM or rearranged front office roles to effectively put a new GM in place. And this wasn’t an anomaly. Of the 30 GM’s who don’t double as team owners (the Jones’ in Dallas and Mike Brown in Cincinnati), only seven have held their position prior to 2010.

There’s no Expected Contract Value—a tool that places a numerical value on a players future job security based on the analysis of past data—for general managers. Still, it’s safe to say decision makers know when their seat is getting warm, and this can lead to a conflict of interests.

This concept of an NFL GM’s entwinement in a catch-22 is not new. However, the analysis involved when making football decisions became more complicated as a result of the 2011 CBA, and this change may be hurting the franchises who employ GM’s on the hot seat.

Prior to 2011, the league operated under a “use it or lose it” set of rules, meaning teams were unable to carryover cap space from year to year. Assuming that the best players cost the most cap dollars, achieving maximum “roster-construction efficiency” in the pre-cap carryover era entailed using as much available cap space as possible from year-to-year. GM’s still had to balance the present and future—prorated contracts and future guarantees still impacted a teams ability to operate in future years the same way it does today. But if a team had extra cap space and could acquire a player without impacting its future, it probably made sense to do so.

Today, teams can carryover cap dollars from one year to the next. Clearly, this should alter the decision-making process of someone who’s supposed to consider both the present and the future impacts of their moves.

For example, look at the trade the Lions made for Haloti Ngata this past offseason. Detroit traded fourth and fifth-round picks to Baltimore in exchange for Ngata and a seventh-round oick. Ngata was set to make an $8.5 million base salary in 2015, will take up $8.5 million of the Lions’ 2015 cap space, and is a free agent after the season.

Before cap carryover was allowed, the Lions front office would have evaluated this trade by comparing how the following would impact their chances of winning in both 2015 and beyond (note that the Lions made this deal about a week into FA, so most difference-making free agents had already signed new deals):

Ngata + 7th round pick


(3rd round pick) + (4th round pick )+ (Ngata 2015 replacement (and cap costs associated w/ replacement))

The ability to carryover cap $ adds an extra element to the evaluation. Today, the analysis consists of weighing the present and future impact of:

(Ngata) + (7th round pick)


(3rd round pick) + (4th round pick) + (Ngata replacement (and cap costs associated w/ replacement)) + ($8.5 mil in future cap $ (minus cost of Ngata replacement))

Whether or not for this trade was worth it in both the short and long term requires further analysis (such as looking at Ngata game-tape). But I question whether Lions GM Martin Mayhew was able to objectively analyze the decision. Despite an 11-5 record in 2014, the Lions haven’t won a playoff game in Mayhew’s 6-year tenure. If Detroit regresses in 2015, it’s certainly possible Mayhew gets fired. Ngata probably won’t lead the Lions to a Super Bowl, but he could help Detroit win an extra game and consequently help Mayhew keep his job.

Mayhew is not the only one. There’s Texans general manager Rick Smith, the NFL’s fifth longest tenured GM who is 11-21 in the past two seasons. This past offseason, he signed the aging Vince Wilfork to a free agent deal and then converted JJ Watt’s $10 roster bonus into a prorated signing bonus in order to free up spending money. It’s tough to envision the winner of the Ryan Mallet/Brian Hoyer quarterback battle helping the Texans compete for a title in Andrew Luck’s AFC South, but it’s possible the money Smith spent will help the Texans sneak into the playoffs. And while this might hurt Houston long-term, a 2015 playoff appearance could save Smith’s job.

And then there’s the Giants Jerry Reese, whose been described by Grantland’s Bill Barnwell as having a “propensity for giving replacement-level talent meaningful money” over the past two offseasons. Had Reese’s lone playoff appearance over the last 6 seasons not ended with a parade through Manhattan, he might already be gone. He’s undoubtedly feeling the heat after back-to-back losing seasons, and it’s fair to wonder whether Reese is irrationally spending money as a result of his own job security.

Weighing choices against both the present and the future is an obstacle decision-makers in any business face. But few industries are as cutthroat as the NFL, and this fact may be preventing the NFL franchises from making the right decisions in an era where salary cap dollars can be carried over.

Andrew Cohen