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A look at the new Proven Performance Escalators for 2nd Round Draft Picks

One of the stranger quirks of the 2011 CBA was centered around a rookie contract mechanism called the Proven Performance Escalator. Simply put, the PPE provided pay raises to rookies in the 4th year of their original contracts, but only for those selected in the 3rd to 7th Rounds. 1st Round picks benefited from larger contracts with more guarantees, 3rd-7th Round picks had the PPE… and 2nd Round picks had nothing. This arguably made 2nd round picks even more valuable than performance data already suggested they were, which was very valuable.

Per the 2011 CBA, if a 3rd-7th Round Draft pick participated in at least 35% of their Club’s offensive or defensive snaps in 2 of their first 3 seasons, or a cumulative average of 35% over their first 3 seasons, their Year 4 base salary would increase to the lowest RFA tender amount ($2.133 million for 2020).

What this looks like in terms of a pay raise: Larry Ogunjobi of the Cleveland Browns was the 65th overall pick in the 2017 Draft, a.k.a. the first pick in the 3rd round. His 2020 base salary has escalated to $2.133 million as a result of his snap counts over the first 3 years of his career. This equated to a raise of $1,135,206 over his original 2020 base salary. The raise brings Ogunjobi’s total 4-year contract amount to $5,042,448. Ogunjobi, at pick No. 65, will now have a larger rookie contract than picks No. 52-No. 64.

13 Draft picks, almost half of the 2nd Round, will make less than Ogunjobi. In fact, No. 71 overall pick Dan Feeney will now also make more on his rookie contract than picks No. 52-No. 64 as a result of the PPE. Almost 20 picks later than No. 52… more money over the rookie contract.

This obviously made no sense, so with the new CBA in 2020 came a Proven Performance Escalator for 2nd Round picks.

There were many modifications to the PPE system, and there are now Level One, Level Two, and Level Three PPEs. Here is the language from the CBA for the 2nd Round PPEs:

Level One Proven Performance Escalator

Level Two & Three Proven Performance Escalator

Below are these qualifiers broken down as well as the requisite raise:

L1: 60% in 2 of 3 first seasons, or a cumulative average of 60% over the first 3 seasons

  • Raise = RFA Original Round Tender Amount

L2: 55% in each of first 3 seasons

  • Raise = RFA Original Round Tender Amount + $250,000

L3: Pro Bowl in one of first 3 seasons

  • Raise = RFA 2nd Round Tender

So, the new CBA has righted the wrong in some respects for 2nd Round Draft picks. They too are eligible for these PPEs now, beginning with players drafted in 2018 (who would see the raise to their 2021 base salary). While there are three levels now, a player cannot stack PPEs, and will only be eligible to receive one pay raise.

I was curious what it would look like if I ran the numbers from 2011-2017 and retroactively applied the Proven Performance Escalators for 2nd Round picks. First, here are all of the players that hit the thresholds for Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. Because a player that hits Level 1 and Level 2 would just receive the Level 2 raise, I have the Utilization numbers in the bottom column.

There were 221 2nd Round Draft picks in the sample. 91 players, or 41.18%, of all 2nd Round picks would have received a PPE raise. 41 would have received Level One, 39 Level Two, and 11 Level Three. All 44 Level Two qualifiers also hit Level One. Of the 11 Level Three qualifiers, 5 qualified for all three PPEs (Bobby Wagner, Derek Carr, Landon Collins, Michael Thomas, and Juju Smith-Schuster), 4 hit Level One and Level Three (Jamie Collins, Le’Veon Bell, Xavien Howard, and Budda Baker), and 2 just hit Level Three by making a Pro Bowl (Kawann Short and Dalvin Cook).

The Level Three breakdown highlights a few complaints I have with the new PPEs. First and foremost, allowing millions of salary dollars to be dictated by a completely arbitrary, fan-vote-based Pro Bowl is just asinine. Why any player’s union in any sport ever agrees to constructs like that I will never know. Secondly and more importantly, snap counts are not created equal for all positions. Positions like QB, OL, and S routinely play upwards of 95% of snaps in a game/season. On the other hand, RBs and DTs like Dalvin Cook and Kawann Short rarely play 60% of snaps in a game/season. All positions are subject to the same snap thresholds to qualify for these PPEs even though all positions are not utilized the same. Long story short… if you’re a nose tackle playing for a small market team, or a team that struggles in the W/L column even though you are balling individually, good luck qualifying for a PPE.

Below is a breakdown of the actual dollars for each year for each Level:

Over $54 million in raises would have gone to these 91 qualifiers, around $600K each, though obviously they would’ve received individual raises of varying amounts. The largest raise would’ve been $1.7 million for Juju Smith-Schuster, the smallest $141,594 for Coby Fleener.

Here’s a breakdown of PPE qualifiers by team:

I wouldn’t say this suggests certain teams are better at drafting in the 2nd Round than others. Oftentimes teams can be forced to play rookie contract players a lot of snaps because they don’t have a quality veteran at the position. However, obviously good players will breakout early and continue to see high snap counts.

2017 2nd Rounders obviously just missed the cut to qualify for these new Escalators, but many are soon to be in extension talks and haven’t begun their 4th years yet, so technically there is still time. If I were their agents, I would bring this up in talks. Even though it’s a brand new rule, it’s worth arguing about and digging for leverage.

Here are the 2017 2nd Rounders and the raises they would have received:

  • Cam Robinson: $374,982
  • Budda Baker: $1,349,641
  • Marcus Maye: $438,270
  • Dalvin Cook: $1,414,639
  • Marcus Williams: $731,035
  • Zach Cunningham: $972,217
  • Chidobe Awuzie: $747,876
  • JuJu Smith-Schuster: $1,708,849
  • Dion Dawkins: $1,011,559
  • Taylor Moton: $764,979

One final issue I would raise if I were a player/agent is players that don’t see the 4th year of their rookie contracts even after qualifying for a PPE. Two players in this sample, Jonathan Martin and Pete Konz, qualified but then didn’t play in Year 4 in the NFL. Some type of bonus payout, perhaps 1/2 of the PPE, would be a fair way to compensate these players for their service in Years 1-3.

The most players to qualify in a single season over the 2011-2017 sample, as illustrated in the first table, was 15 in 2012. The 2018 class has proven already to be a great 2nd Round class, and will be able to collect these PPEs in 2021. 13 of them already have qualified and 5 others are very likely to qualify barring injury or another issue in 2020. Those 13 players are:

  • Will Hernandez
  • Nick Chubb
  • Darius Leonard
  • Braden Smith
  • James Daniels
  • Courtland Sutton
  • Harold Landry
  • Christian Kirk
  • Connor Williams
  • Jessie Bates III
  • Donte Jackson
  • Brian O’Neill
  • Carlton Davis

Keep an eye out for 2021 to see their raises go into effect.

One final note, while the PPE numbers may seem small on an individual basis, these raises can influence decisions. One such example: Zay Jones qualified for the PPE in just his first two seasons in Buffalo by playing over 60% of snaps both years. Do the Raiders still make the trade for Jones if his 4th year salary was higher? Do the terms change?

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Analyzing Draft Trades & Current GM Trends

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(Updated to reflect all trades through 4/28/2021)

It is officially peak mock draft season. Everyone is hypothesizing where certain players will go and to which teams. And now that we’re less than one week away from the big day on April 23rd, it has become mock draft trade season.

Everyone wants to know if their favorite team will move up for their favorite target, or trade down to get a few more dart throws. Will they tap into their future draft capital in an effort to bolster their roster ASAP? There are endless possibilities, and while every Draft is always different, we can gain insights into the strategies of certain GMs based on their historical moves.

So, what type of GM does your team have? Who makes a lot of moves and who tends to stand pat? The numbers below cover the 2011-2019 Drafts, since the introduction of the Rookie Wage Scale:

GMs that maneuver Up & Down:

  • Les Snead, Los Angeles Rams (9 Up, 16 Down). Les Snead is always looking to bounce around the NFL Draft in search of value. Sometimes it seems like the Rams and Patriots make trades with each other just to spice things up and keep other teams on their toes. All jokes aside, the Rams have been involved in many of the major trades of the decade. They traded out of pick No. 2 for a huge haul in 2012 when the Redskins moved up for Robert Griffin III. Then their turn to strike on a franchise QB came in 2016, when they moved up to No. 1 for Jared Goff.
  • Howie Roseman, Philadelphia Eagles (10 Up, 16 Down). Howie Roseman wheels and deals around the Draft like nobodies business, accumulating more picks when smart to drop back and making moves up when called for. The Eagles are always a team to keep an eye on in the Draft, and this year is no different. At pick No. 21 in the first round, they’re in a pivotal spot that could call for a move in either direction depending how the board falls.
  • Jason Licht, Tampa Bay Buccaneers (8 Up, 4 Down). The Buccaneers have had a smart approach to the NFL Draft: Trade Down from higher up in the Draft when the value (positional value or player value) isn’t there, and Trade Up later on when the price isn’t as steep.
  • Steve Keim, Arizona Cardinals (4 Up, 5 Down). The Cardinals made the gutsy (and smart) call in 2019 to draft Kyler Murray No. 1 overall, even after they had just traded up for and drafted Josh Rosen at No. 10 overall in 2018. In general, the Cardinals are not afraid to move up or down early in the Draft. They find themselves in the Top 10 again this year at No. 8, and while the available talent will likely be too good to pass up, I could see them fielding calls hoping a team makes an offer they can’t refuse.
  • John Lynch, San Francisco 49ers (6 Up, 4 Down). It’s still pretty early in John Lynch’s tenure in San Francisco, but he has not been a stranger to Draft trades. The 49ers acquired the No. 13 pick in the 2020 Draft from the Indianapolis Colts for DeForest Buckner, giving them two first round picks (their own is No. 31), and then traded down one spot with Tampa Bay to No. 14 – recouping a fourth-round pick in the process. This year they’ve of course made the blockbuster of the year, moving up to No. 3 to select a quarterback.
  • Mike Mayock & Jon Gruden, Oakland Raiders (3 Up, 3 Down). While the duo has only been in Oakland for two Drafts thus far, they’ve demonstrated a clear willingness to maneuver with six Draft trades over the course of their tenure.
  • Chris Grier, Miami Dolphins (3 Up, 4 Down) (hired 2019 season). Grier has been stockpiling picks, and is never afraid of any move. After trading down from No. 3 to No. 12 with the 49ers, Grier moved back up to No. 6 with Philadelphia to stay in striking range of one of the elite prospects in this year’s class.
  • Eric DeCosta, Baltimore Ravens (2 Up, 2 Down) (hired 2019 season). DeCosta is a disciple of longtime Ravens GM Ozzie Newsome, but we may want to see a few more Drafts from him before making any declarations. In 2019, the Ravens traded down early and then made a move up late. Newsome would have landed in the “maneuver Up & Down” category with 6 Trade-Ups to 8 Trade-Downs from 2011-2018, so DeCosta appears to have picked up where he let off.

There is value in moving around the Draft and becoming a friendly trade partner with various teams. You can avoid reaching on a player if you are fielding multiple trade offers from teams looking to move up. It can be beneficial if teams know you’re open for business, and perhaps the price can be driven up if teams suspect another club is on Line 2.

GMs that move Up for their favorite guys:

  • Mickey Loomis, New Orleans Saints (13 Up, 0 Down). The Saints don’t mess around in the Draft. If they like a player, they go get him. Since Drew Brees arrived in 2006, the fewest wins they’ve had in a season is 7. They clearly don’t like waiting around until their pick arrives, and Brees was too good for them to ever end up with a Top 10 pick. If you’re a team looking to move up to their spot, maybe save yourself the phone call and reach out to the team with the pick after theirs.
  • Jon Robinson, Tennessee Titans (8 Up, 4 Down). Robinson has held his position since 2016, and in that time has been pretty aggressive in the Draft. In 2016, the Titans landed a huge haul for the No. 1 pick and the rights to Jared Goff (acquiring picks No. 15, 43, 45, 76, a future 1st, and a future 3rd). Since adding all of that capital, they’ve been going after their targets.
  • Ryan Pace, Chicago Bears (8 Up, 3 Down). Ryan Pace has been running the show in Chicago since 2015 and has made some bold moves in the Draft already during his five year tenure, including two Trade-Ups in the Top 10. They’ve also traded future Draft capital in three consecutive years (a future 2nd for WR Anthony Miller in 2018, a future 4th in 2019 for RB David Montgomery, and a future 4th in 2020 for ED Trevis Gipson). On the other hand, they’ve also traded down in the second round three times (landing Cody Whitehair and Tarik Cohen in the process). Don’t be surprised by a move in either direction.
  • Dave Gettleman, New York Giants (5 Up, 0 Down). Gettleman has served as an NFL GM for eight years with two franchises (five in Carolina, three so far in New York), and has never traded Down in either tenure. He doesn’t move much period, though, preferring to stand pat with the picks he was originally given. There are rumblings of a Giants Trade-Down from No. 11, but we wouldn’t count on it.
  • Brandon Beane, Buffalo Bills (4 Up). Beane has only held his role since 2018, so it may be too soon to reach a true conclusion. However, in the three Draft’s he has overseen in Buffalo, he has traded up four times with zero moves back. More importantly, three of these trades were in the Top 40 picks (Josh Allen at No. 7, Tremaine Edmunds at No. 16, and Cody Ford at No. 38). Beane is not afraid to pursue potential impact players.
  • Brett Veach, Kansas City Chiefs (4 Up). Veach has only been GM since 2018, so it may be more fair to put him in the “too soon to tell” category. Although he has been somewhat aggressive thus far, we think any GM with Patrick Mahomes on a rookie contract would do the same.
  • Brian Gutekunst, Green Bay Packers (4 Up, 1 Down). It is very early in his tenure, but Gutekunst has certainly broken off from the traditional Packers mold, being aggressive in free agency and making big first-round Trade-Ups in his first two seasons. Gutekunst had a slam dunk Trade-Down with the Saints in 2018 that netted an extra 1st in 2019 along with pick No. 24. He promptly moved back up and nabbed Jaire Alexander at No. 18 overall. He followed that up with a move up to No. 21 in 2019 to take Darnell Savage. Long story short, Gutekunst isn’t going to just wait around for his picks.

Trading up is risky business, as you have to “overpay” (according to the Draft Value charts) by larger amounts the higher you move. Nevertheless, clearly some of the teams on this list have had some success. No team has ever been able to consistently “beat” the Draft and outperform others year-over-year, so the thinking is the more picks the better. Eventually you’ll have to spend more in Free Agency to fill out your roster, and if you do miss on guys then you’re really toast. But, on the other end of the spectrum, a strong draft class can go a long way in catapulting a team to success.

GMs that like to move Down and stockpile Draft Capital:

  • Rick Spielman, Minnesota Vikings (9 Up, 28 Down). The Vikings prioritize getting as many dart throws as possible, which has definitely proven successful. In 2012, the Vikings traded down from No. 3 to No. 4 with the Browns. Trent Richardson ended up in Cleveland and the Vikings landed Matt Kalil. Two years later in 2014, the Browns called again looking to move up one spot from No. 9 to No. 8. Justin Gilbert ended up in Cleveland and the Vikings took Anthony Barr. One thing is for sure, if the Browns call the Vikings answer (on the first ring).
  • Bill Belichick, New England Patriots (13 Up, 23 Down). The Patriots arguably belong in the first grouping, as they move around the Draft unlike anyone else. But, as you can see, they move back more than they jump up. They also made a lot of these 13 trade-ups in recent years, presumably to keep making Super Bowl runs with Tom Brady. Now that they’re onto their next chapter, we’d expect them to get back to their stockpiling ways that led to so much long-term success in the first place.
  • John Schneider, Seattle Seahawks (10 Up, 18 Down). When you draft Russell Wilson, Kam Chancellor, and Richard Sherman all in the 3rd Round or later, what’s the point in trading up anyway?!
  • Chris Ballard, Indianapolis Colts (3 Up, 8 Down). Ballard is relatively new to his position, hired in 2017, but has already made it pretty clear that he prefers to stockpile picks. The Trade-Downs occurred much earlier than the Trade-Ups, most notably when the Colts sent pick No. 3 in 2018 to the Jets for No. 6, 37, 49 & a 2020 2nd which turned out to be pick No. 34. The players taken with those picks look quite promising thus far, perhaps inspiring more of the same from Ballard.

It is probably not a coincidence that the first three GMs in this group have all been in their positions for a decade-plus (Belichick is of course HC, but is also considered the top executive for the Patriots with significant control over personnel decisions). It’s important to point out they are also not averse to moving up to get their guy when they have conviction. They understand that in order to do so without sacrificing their shot at multiple impact players each year, it’s smart to bolster their arsenal beforehand. Trading down often allows you to trade up. They all have about a 2-1 Down-Up ratio, so the extra Draft Capital they accumulate doesn’t go to waste, and they don’t just draft fifteen 7th-rounders every year. They move back when the value isn’t there, and they pounce when they don’t want to wait any longer and risk losing a guy they’re high on.

GMs that like to stand pat:

  • Kevin Colbert, Pittsburgh Steelers (4 Up). 2019’s move to No. 10 to take Devin Bush came as a complete shock, as the Steelers rarely maneuver around the Draft at all. They have not traded back so far this decade, and the other three trade-ups occurred in the 3rd Round or later.
  • Mike Brown, Cincinnati Bengals (4 Up, 5 Down). The Bengals tend to work with the Draft picks given to them, and are also great at earning compensatory picks. It is important to note however, that their Trade-Down moves occur much earlier in the Draft than their Trade-Ups, if they do move at all.
  • Tom Telesco, Los Angeles Chargers (4 Up). The Chargers rarely make any Draft trades, preferring instead to sit tight. Nevertheless, there is a key detail to these four prior trade-ups for 2020 Draft purposes: all four occurred in the Top 50 picks. The one exception Telesco and the Chargers make to their no-trade approach… when they want to add a premier talent. They moved up to No. 23 in the 2020 Draft to land LB Kenneth Murray, and may be interested in doing the same in 2021 to secure a blue chip left tackle for franchise QB Justin Herbert.
  • Jerry & Stephen Jones, Dallas Cowboys (6 Up, 4 Down). The Cowboys have also been strong in the compensatory pick game much like the Cincinnati Bengals, and prefer to utilize their own Draft picks. They’ll make rare exceptions, but I wouldn’t count on any early-round trades in most years.

There is nothing inherently wrong with sticking with what you were given and trusting your Big Board. The Cowboys have been very strong drafters for example, but the rest of this list has struggled a bit in the Draft from 2011-2018. You don’t want to reach for players, and that seems somewhat unavoidable if you’re unwilling to move up or down.

Too soon to tell:

  • Joe Douglas, New York Jets (0 Up, 2 Down), (hired 2020 season).
  • Andrew Berry, Cleveland Browns (0 Up, 2 Down), (hired 2020 season). Berry is a disciple of Sashi Brown, a.k.a. the Trade-Down King. No matter what you do with trades, you just have to scout talent better than Brown & Co. did during his time in Cleveland. If Berry can combine the smart, analytical approach of trading down with quality scouting… watch out NFL.
  • Ron Rivera, Washington Football Team (hired 2020 season). Washington hired former Lions GM Martin Mayhew to serve in the same role in the 2021 season.
  • George Paton, Denver Broncos (hired 2021 season). Paton is a disciple of Rick Spielman, and has made comments suggesting he may too look to move down more often than up. While John Elway is no longer the GM, he does still have a role in Denver. Here was his blurb: John Elway, Denver Broncos (7 Up, 10 Down). The Broncos had a bit of a funny draw in their Draft in 2019, trading down from No. 10 for a team looking for an inside linebacker, and then trading up to No. 42 for their potential franchise QB. Usually you’d expect the opposite. Nevertheless, the Broncos have done well to add value via Trade-Downs (they still have Pittsburgh’s 3rd this year as a result of the Devin Bush trade) and have picked their spots to make a move as well.
  • Brad Holmes, Detroit Lions (hired 2021 season).
  • Terry Fontenot, Atlanta Falcons (hired 2021 season).
  • Trent Baalke, Jacksonville Jaguars (hired 2021 season). However, in San Francisco, Baalke’s trade record from 2011-2016 was: 8 Up, 11 Down
  • Scott Fitterer, Carolina Panthers (hired 2021 season).
  • Nick Caserio, Houston Texans (hired 2021 season).

Now that you know which Draft trade strategies you can expect from some NFL GMs, what have these trends led to in terms of increased/decreased Draft Capital over the years? While many GMs have come and gone over the course of the decade, for this research we took a look at overall team results. We broke down the Surplus Value Gained and Lost for every team from 2011-2018 according to the Jimmy Johnson, Rich Hill, Chase Stuart, and Fitzgerald-Spielberger Draft Value charts:

Draft Pick Value Gained/Lost 2011-2018 (Value as a Draft Pick # in parentheses)

The way we like to describe the difference between these first two Draft charts and the next two is this: The Jimmy Johnson and Rich Hill charts reflect the perceived trade value of each team’s Draft picks based on historical Draft trades. The Chase Stuart and Fitzgerald-Spielberger Draft charts reflect the true value of the Draft picks as players.

There are of course mixed results with any process, and at the end of the day scouting top talent is what matters most. To that end, the two best teams of the decade (Patriots & Seahawks) are No. 2 and No. 3 in Total Draft Value added per the Fitzgerald-Spielberger chart. However, the worst team of the decade is also No. 1 (Browns).

The Browns only had the opportunity to be so high on this list because they routinely started with Top 5 picks in most Draft years, thus providing an opportunity to land a huge haul from QB-needy teams. Don’t be mistaken though, they also traded up to No. 3 and No. 8 over this span, selecting Trent Richardson and Justin Gilbert. Their final huge Trade-Down in 2017 was a success, netting them the No. 4 overall pick in 2018 from the Houston Texans (which they used on Denzel Ward). Unfortunately, they acquired that No. 12 pick by trading down from No. 2 with the Eagles in 2016 (Carson Wentz). And more unfortunately, that No. 12 pick was used on Deshaun Watson. Trading down is the smart move over the long run by a good margin, but you still have to hit on some of your newly acquired Draft picks.

The Draft is just five days away. Be prepared for much more chaos and the rumor mill to kick into overdrive.

Follow me on Twitter @BradOTC for analysis of every Draft trade of 2020. According to many reports, it could be a strange year for Draft trades because of the conditions surrounding COVID-19. Teams may look to unload 2020 Draft picks because they have less confidence in their player analysis as a result of far fewer Pro-Days and in-person visits. Should be interesting!

Examining Draft Pick Approximate Value & Team Success in the Rookie Wage Scale Era

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I recently posted a breakdown of each team’s Draft success from 2011-2014 based on the Fitzgerald-Spielberger/Top 5 APY metric (concept explained here with a table of Draft pick values). I wanted to expand on the research with an investigation of Pro Football Reference Approximate Value. First, below is the Top 5 APY table:

2011-2014 Top 5 APY Over Expected

The above table examines every Draft pick from 2011-2014 for each team. The “Draft Pick Total T5APY” column lists the Total Top 5 APY or “T5APY” of every pick. Here is an example of how to calculate an individual player’s T5APY: “The Top 5 QB contracts based on APY (average per year) are $35 million, $34 million, $33.5 million, $33.5 million, and $32 million. The average of these 5 APY’s is $33.6 million. An APY of $16.8 million would thus be 50% of T5APY.”

We converted each post-rookie contract in each off-season into a percent of the T5APY average at the respective position. Next, we developed an expected T5APY for each Draft slot. For example, a No. 3 overall pick has an expected T5APY of around 80%. In other words, a No. 3 overall pick can be expected to sign a post-rookie contract worth 80% of the average of the Top 5 APY’s at their position. The “Draft Pick Expected T5APY” column is therefore the sum of all expected T5APY’s based on Draft slot.

Next, the “Total T5APY – Total Expected T5APY” is the actual results of each player’s post-rookie contract compared to their expectation based on their Draft slot. For example, if a No. 3 overall pick signed a post-rookie contract for 60% of T5APY, they would register as -20%.

The next column, “Total Plus/Minus Divided by Picks,” is what the table is ranked by. This divides the “Total T5APY – Total Expected T5APY” by the number of Draft picks. As you can see, the Baltimore Ravens were the best drafting team from 2011-2014 on a per pick basis. With their 35 draft picks over the four years, they beat Draft slot expectations by an average of 9.27%. While impressive, this also demonstrates that even the best drafting team over a multi-year stretch couldn’t beat Draft slot expectations by 10% on average.

It is also interesting to note, as you can see in the final column, “% of Draft Picks Above Expectation,” that the Ravens were not No. 1. That honor belongs to the Miami Dolphins, whose Draft picks signed a post-rookie contract that exceeded Draft slot expectations 43.75% of the time. More simply, 14 of the Dolphins’ 32 Draft picks over the four-year stretch signed larger post-rookie contracts than expected… and this was tops in the NFL. Again, the Draft is very hard.

I wanted to take this same principle and apply it using Chase Stuart’s Draft Pick value chart that uses Pro Football Reference Approximate Value (explained here). We can now add the 2015 Draft class as they have completed five seasons (whereas not all 2015 Draft picks have signed post-rookie contracts… No. 1 overall pick Jameis Winston being one such example).

Chase Stuart also developed a five-year AV expectation for each Draft pick, so I compared the actual AV output in every player’s first five seasons to their Draft slot expectation and ran the same analysis. Note: I did not only count the AV that a player contributed to his drafting team. I wanted to gauge a team’s ability to scout talent, not necessarily develop it. Furthermore, certain teams will have positions filled by veterans and no potential for a Draft pick to break into the lineup. This doesn’t mean the player is bad or the team is bad at scouting talent, it could just mean they were too stacked at that player’s position for him to see the field. However, there are many instances of these teams trading away such a player who gets an opportunity to log significant snaps elsewhere and they recoup solid Draft capital in return, arguably adding value for themselves via this player just in an indirect way.

Finally, on the opposite end of the spectrum, AV is an imperfect “WAR” metric because it is so heavily based on merely seeing the field, and a player can log a lot of bad snaps and still rack up AV. In the same way a team didn’t necessarily fail when a Draft pick doesn’t accumulate AV under their rookie contract, they didn’t necessarily succeed when a Draft pick is forced to play a lot and accumulates AV because the roster is weak at a certain position. For example, the aforementioned Jameis Winston accumulated an AV of 59 over his first five seasons, good for 14.4 AV Over Expectation. Nevertheless, he is still without a post-rookie contract as of today. This is a big reason why the Fitzgerald-Spielberger metric was developed, because we believe the open market does the best job of truly evaluating players (in essence, we’re following the money).

While AV is imperfect for these reasons, with five full Draft’s worth of data, the anomalies tend to cancel out and a clear correlation between Draft AV and Team Success emerges. First, here is the overall breakdown of Draft AV Over Expectation:

Total AV Over Expectation 2011-2015

To provide a frame of reference, Calais Campbell had a 2019 AV of 10, which is a good year worth Pro Bowl consideration. A rather average season for a 16 game starter would be around a 5 AV. Chase Stuart found that a replacement level AV for a season was around 2. Individual seasons are not great ways to compare players (the creator of AV says so himself), but 5 seasons for each player vastly improves the overall outlook.

It is important to note that Chase Stuart’s Draft Pick Values are based on Value Above Replacement Player. So, he subtracted 2 AV (the single-season AV he determined was replacement level) from every player season to develop his expected value table. Therefore, over 5 seasons you would subtract 10 AV from every player. For the table column “AV Over Expectation,” I chose to not remove the 10 AV for each player just so it is not a mess of negative decimal values. The team rankings would still be the same, but it would show the Seahawks were the only team in the NFL from 2011-2015 that drafted above replacement level on average. Their Total AV Over Expectation would be 22, across 47 Draft picks, good for +.47 AV Over Expectation Per Pick. The Panthers at No. 2 would have a Total AV Over Expectation of -7.7, across 31 Draft picks, good for -.25 AV Over Expectation Per Pick. Every team is going to select players that never see the field and register a five-season AV of 0, it’s simply unavoidable. In this 2011-2015 sample, about 11.75% or 1 in every 8.5 Draft picks registered a five-season AV of 0. (Shoutout Cardinals QB Ryan Lindley (-4) and Lions K Nate Freese (-1) for the only negative five-season AV’s in the sample).

Over this 5-year sample, the best AV Over Expectation was Russell Wilson, whose total AV of 84 exceeded his No. 75 Draft slot expectation (17.1) by 66.9. The worst was 2013 No. 3 overall pick Dion Jordan, whose total AV of 4 fell short of his No. 3 Draft slot expectation (37.6) by 33.6.

It should come as no surprise that the Seahawks had the No. 1 (Wilson), No. 2 (Richard Sherman), and No. 5 (Bobby Wagner) Draft picks based on AV Over Expectation. The Seahawks also had their Draft picks exceed 5-year expectations 34.04% of the time. So, over 1/3 of Seattle’s Draft picks from 2011-2015 produced more AV over their first five seasons than was expected based on where they were selected. They not only had 3 mega hits, but they were pretty consistent as well.

Next, I split the teams’ Draft picks into Offense and Defense. First, here is Offense:

Offense AV Over Expectation 2011-2015

Next, Defense:

Defense AV Over Expectation 2011-2015

Finally, while I fully recognize Draft pick production is just one (albeit large) part of the equation when it comes to competing in the NFL, I wanted to cross-reference these rankings with team W-L rankings:

AV Over Expectation vs. W/L Record

Because 2015 Draft picks had their first five seasons span from 2015-2019, I compiled the W-L records from 2011-2019. First caveat, this obviously ignores Draft classes from 2016-2019, which are pretty important (Nick Bosa and Deebo Samuel for example Oh, or Patrick Mahomes…). Secondly, it ignores the teams’ rosters entering the sample in 2011. Nevertheless, the correlation is pretty clear. It may not look it at first when you look at the teams highlighted in Green or Red. These are all the teams whose ranking in Draft AV Over Expectation Per Pick differed from their W-L Rank by 10 or more. Check out this very scientific reasoning that explains almost all of the Green team variance:

Patriots – Tom Brady & Bill Belichick

Green Bay Packers – Aaron Rodgers & Mike McCarthy

Pittsburgh Steelers – Ben Roethlisberger & Mike Tomlin

New Orleans Saints – Drew Brees & Sean Payton

Denver Broncos – Peyton Manning

Philadelphia Eagles – Andy Reid, Michael Vick, Doug Pederson, Carson Wentz.

Lastly, a perfect example of what can happen with some awful Draft classes: San Francisco 49ers – Jim Harbaugh and Colin Kaepernick. BUT, in the four seasons from 2011-2014 they had 44 wins. In the four seasons from 2015-2018, they had 17. Clearly, those Draft classes caught up to them. Their 2016-2019 Draft classes featured DeForest Buckner, George Kittle, Mike McGlinchey, Fred Warner, Nick Bosa and Deebo Samuel. They also added arguably the best offensive mind in football in Kyle Shanahan at HC.

The Red teams are essentially the exact opposite. These teams featured Quarterback carousels that brought everything else down, and a good amount of coaching turmoil. The Cardinals with a healthy Carson Palmer and Bruce Arians at HC from 2013-2015 went 29-9 with an NFC Championship appearance. Everything besides that was… not pretty.

At the end of the day, this game is, and always will be, about Draft picks. Just 10 days away from Christmas morning, er, I mean Day One of the NFL Draft on April 23.

Keep an eye out for another article coming soon exploring Draft Pick trades from 2011-2019.

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Examining NFL Draft Capital in 2019 & Looking Ahead to 2020

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While we are still a few months away from the 2020 NFL Draft, I wanted to get started on some preliminary Draft content before we hit Free Agency.

Knowing the relative Draft Capital of each team will also assist in your understanding of how Free Agency plays out. Teams will look to improve their roster through both avenues separately, but a cohesive plan that takes financial and positional considerations into account is vital to success.

What do I mean by Draft Capital? Simply, the Total Value of all Draft Picks for each team. Where am I getting the values of each pick? The Jimmy Johnson, Rich Hill and Jason Fitzgerald Draft Pick Value Charts.

Jimmy Johnson and Rich Hill effectively codified the NFL’s valuation of each draft pick based on previous draft pick trades (methodology explained here). Jason valued the draft picks based on the historical Second Contract outcomes of draft picks (methodology explained here). The Rich Hill rankings most closely resemble what NFL teams believe they have in Draft Capital. The Fitzgerald rankings most closely demonstrate what teams truly have in Draft Capital.

Here are Jimmy Johnson’s Chart Values:

Here are Rich Hill’s Chart Values:

Finally, here is the Jason Fitzgerald Draft Value Chart:

Let’s look at the Arizona Cardinals as an example. The Arizona Cardinals have the No. 8, No. 40, No. 72, No. 111, No. 153, and No. 222 Draft picks for 2020. You can find their Total Draft Capital by simply adding up the Values associated with those draft picks for each chart.

According to the Jimmy Johnson chart, Arizona has a Draft Capital of 2235 points. According to Rich Hill, Arizona has a Draft Capital of 662 points. Finally, according to Jason Fitzgerald’s chart, Arizona has a Draft Capital of 4736 points.

But what do these random numbers tell us? Not much without context. One way to make Draft Capital more approachable is to look at the Value as a percent of the Total Draft Pick Pool.

With 32 teams, an exactly equal distribution of all 256 Draft Picks would come out to 3.125% of the Draft Pick Pool per team. For the Jimmy Johnson chart, 2235 points is 3.68% of the Total Draft Pick Pool. So according to Jimmy Johnson, Arizona has slightly more Draft Capital than the average team. For Rich Hill, that percentage decreases slightly to 3.6%, but Arizona remains above average. Finally, for Jason Fitzgerald, that percentage moves across the 3.125% line to 3.09%. Jason’s chart believes Arizona has less Draft Capital than the standard average.

This approach still has its limitations, as each Draft is different. To take it one step further, how Arizona’s Draft Capital stacks up against the other teams in the league is the truly critical information.

The below table illustrates the 2020 Draft Capital for every team according to Jimmy Johnson, Rich Hill, and Jason Fitzgerald’s Draft Value Charts. The far right column shows the difference in perceived value between Rich Hill and Jason Fitzgerald.

The above chart shows the 2020 Draft Capital for every team, including our Compensatory Pick guru Nick Korte’s projected compensatory picks for 2020.

Based on our analysis of every draft pick trade from 2011-2019, the Rich Hill Values most closely resemble what NFL teams are currently using to facilitate draft pick trades. The biggest disparities between Rich Hill’s chart and Jason Fitzgerald’s chart can largely be explained by the NFL overvaluing top draft picks and greatly undervaluing second and third round picks.

The Ravens (+11), Broncos (+9) and Eagles (+9) being the three teams that the Fitzgerald Chart valued the most as compared to the Rich Hill Chart is entirely unsurprising. The Ravens have earned the most compensatory picks of any franchise in the NFL since compensatory picks were created, and they trade down very often. The Broncos traded down from No. 10 to No. 20 with the Steelers just last year in a great trade for Denver in which they added a 2020 3rd Round pick. And the Eagles have embraced analytical decision-making in all facets of football as much or more than any other NFL team.

So what can we do with this information? Let’s take a look at 2019 Draft Capital before the Draft began…

There were 37 “draft pick trades” (exclusively draft picks exchanging hands) during the 2019 NFL Draft. Another very unsurprising development: smart teams trade down a lot. It is no coincidence that the teams that traded down three or more times in 2019 were: the LA Rams, Minnesota Vikings, New England Patriots, Oakland Raiders and Seattle Seahawks. Now I know one of these is not like the other, but the Raiders maneuvered around the 2019 Draft exceptionally well.

2019 NFL Draft Trades by Team

These trades obviously occurred all throughout the draft, and the amount of value exchanging hands for a trade in the 1st Round is a lot different than one in the 6th Round. Here is the breakdown of the Draft Value that teams Gained or Lost:

As noted before, these Values don’t mean much in a vacuum. So, I converted the values back into the respective Draft Pick they equate to on each chart. For example, as you can see above the Atlanta Falcons Lost 648 points with their 3 Trade-Ups according to the Jason Fitzgerald chart. 648 points on the Fitzgerald chart equates to the No. 87 overall pick. The Rich Hill chart has the Falcons Loss at 9 points, which equates to pick No. 164. In contrast, the Jimmy Johnson chart has the Falcons Gain 30.6 points, which equates to the No. 151 pick.

Here is the same 2019 Draft Pick Trade Summary chart as above, except with the Values as Draft Picks:

The Falcons example perfectly demonstrates the dangers of relying on the Jimmy Johnson Draft Pick Chart, which teams still appear to consult to varying degrees based on analysis of Draft Pick trades from 2011-2019. Calculating these Gains & Losses using the Values derived from Fitzgerald’s research of the historical outcomes of Draft Picks, the Falcons gave up a 3rd Round pick in Total Draft Capital through moving up three times. Calculating these Gains & Losses using an arbitrary point system with no known connection to data, the Falcons ADDED a 5th Round pick in Total Draft Capital according to the Jimmy Johnson chart. This disconnect can create tremendous value opportunities for smart teams, and it already has for some. Even when comparing Gains & Losses with the Rich Hill Chart (an update & improvement of the Jimmy Johnson Chart) there are still some large gaps in valuation.

The Falcons didn’t give up the most value according to the Fitzgerald chart though. That honor was reserved for the Pittsburgh Steelers, who made the biggest Trade-Up of 2019 from No. 20 (+ No. 52, + a 2020 3rd) to No. 10 to select Devin Bush. As you can see above, the Steelers clearly must at least look at the Jimmy Johnson Draft Value chart. I say this because according to the Jimmy Johnson chart, the Steelers and Broncos made a trade that was exactly equal in value for both parties. This is extremely rare for trades in the first two or three rounds. However, Jason Fitzgerald’s data tells us the Steelers gave up value equivalent to the No. 40 overall pick with the package they sent to Denver to move to No. 10. Rich Hill’s chart goes even further and actually tells the Steelers they won the trade and added value equivalent to the No. 100 overall pick. Imagine two NFL Draft war rooms wherein both teams thought they made out like absolute bandits in a trade. That is often the reality! The Jimmy Johnson & Rich Hill charts severely over-inflate the value of top picks and even more severely undervalue second and third round picks. That’s exactly what happened here.

One final component on display with the Steelers & Broncos trade that explains the large disparity: the future pick the Steelers included, a 2020 3rd. The analysis of trades from 2011-2019 seemed to confirm a long-held belief about perceived value in NFL Draft trades. The notion that when teams trade a future draft pick in the following year, they devalue the future pick by one round. For example, the 2020 3rd in this trade was treated as a mid-4th Round pick (No. 112) for the purposes of running this trade through the Johnson and/or Hill calculator to get as close to equal value as possible.

This methodology of devaluing future picks to the middle of the following round (No. 48, No. 80, No. 112, No. 144, No. 176, No. 208, No. 240) is imperfect for a few reasons, but still provided consistent results throughout the sample. First, teams don’t know if they will win the Super Bowl or have the No. 1 overall pick any given year (some may have better ideas than others over a stretch, but parity is real in the NFL). Second, compensatory picks make the length of the 3rd-7th Rounds different every year (Supplemental Draft pick usage can take a pick away from a team as well). Nevertheless, the Johnson and Hill charts have a much steeper decline in Draft Pick Value after the 1st Round than the Fitzgerald chart.

The “Rank” columns above really drive the point home: Jason Fitzgerald’s chart shows the Steelers gave up the most Draft Capital of anyone in 2019 through their big trade-up. Meanwhile, the Rich Hill chart tells the Steelers they added the second-most Draft Capital in the league. In their defense, and to play Devils Advocate a bit, if all of the other teams use the Jimmy Johnson and/or Rich Hill chart too then this isn’t that cut and dry. However, we know that the Fitzgerald Draft Values are based on actual data and are thus far more informative and predictive. For those that are fans of the Chase Stuart AV Draft Pick Value chart using Pro Football Reference’s Approximate Value metric, the Fitzgerald chart and Stuart chart are very similar.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Seahawks effectively added another 1st Round pick (No. 33 overall) with their series of Trade-Downs. The Seahawks traded back from their first spot of the night, No. 21 overall, and kept moving back to stockpile picks. Here is where every team started the Draft in terms of Draft Capital and where they stood by the end:

Future draft picks that were not accounted for in the Draft Capital before the Draft began were of course introduced, which makes this chart imperfect. But there aren’t many high priced future draft picks (especially when you devalue them all by a round) exchanging hands in a given Draft, so the impact is not too large. The Seahawks started the Draft with the 25th-most Draft Capital according to Jason Fitzgerald and ended it with the 7th-most, and they didn’t acquire any future picks. So within the 2019 Draft itself, the Seahawks were able to go from the bottom-third to the top-third in Draft Capital. How do you have a winning record for eight straight seasons? Well, there’s part of your answer.

I will be updating the 2020 Draft Capital as trades unfold throughout the offseason until the NFL Draft on April 23rd.

By: Brad Spielberger (@BradOTC)

Introducing Our NFL Draft Research Book: A Pre-Screening Offer for NFL Teams & Affiliated Parties

We are excited to announce the debut of a small research book that focuses on the successes and failures in the modern NFL draft:

The Drafting Stage – Creating a Marketplace for NFL Draft Picks

Written by: Brad Spielberger & Jason Fitzgerald 

If you work in/are affiliated with the NFL and are interested in receiving an electronic copy of the book, please email Brad at

The concept for the research was to use NFL salary data to retroactively grade every draft selection from 2011 through 2015 following the conclusion of their rookie contracts, and to use that data to better project the value of each future draft selection. To the best of our knowledge nobody has used this type of metric to value draft selections, as most other papers have dealt with inputs like “years making a pro bowl,” or “games started” to value the contribution and talent level of a draft pick in the NFL. Nothing is more all-encompassing, in our opinion, than the ultimate salary of a player, which should be reflective of every aspect of the player’s game.  

We extended the study to go beyond just the typical “draft pick values” that are usually derived from draft analysis work. In the book we touch on the following: 

  • Assessing every draft pick trade outcome from 2011 to 2015, by round, to determine who was the ultimate “winner and loser” based on the financial outcomes of the trade 
  • Developing Tiers based on a player’s salary to better identify the probabilities of finding a superstar, starter, backup, or replacement level player in the draft based on the draft round and position played 
  • Creating a system to evaluate contracts fairly and independent of position to better illustrate the value that can be found based on position influenced drafting 
  • Examining the success rates and selection rates by position to provide better information on when to strike on a specific position in the draft 
  • Providing some context to the idea of finding “ten-year starters” in the draft through examining the actual outcomes of every draft pick selected during the draft years that were studied  
  • Identifying the typical range and price of free agent talent available to better plan what positions should perhaps be given additional weight in the draft 

NFL 2019 Snap-shot: 2020 UFA usage through 9 Weeks

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We are now halfway through the 2019 NFL season and the trade deadline is officially in the rear view mirror. Most rosters are pretty set at this point, though there will of course always be minor roster shuffling throughout the season.

I wanted to update the previous snaps article (read here) and add some new data into the fold.

Using the new OTC Valuation Metric, I compiled the Current APYs of each team’s UFAs. Next, I have the Positional Value for each player as determined by the new OTC Valuation Metric. Finally, there is the Value Over Current APY.

I wanted to add our new valuation component because, as I mentioned in the original article, not all snaps are created equal. The valuation metric puts a dollar amount on the players that are headed out the door after 2019. We can see which teams are paying more than they need to for certain players based on their production halfway through the season, and if they shouldn’t be too worried about replacing them in free agency at the right price. On the flip side, we can see which teams are getting quality production out of a currently cheap asset that will soon cost much more. The proprietary OTC Valuation metric was created by OTC in partnership with Pro Football Focus).

First, here are updated tables for offense, defense and overall snaps attributed to 2020 UFAs for each team (% Change from Weeks 1-4):

Overall Snaps (Offense + Defense) by 2020 UFAs Weeks 1-9
Offense Snaps by 2020 UFAs Weeks 1-9
Defense Snaps by 2020 UFAs Weeks 1-9

Next, I broke each team’s UFAs down according to the OTC Valuation Metric following the first nine weeks of the season (there have been 135 of the 256 total NFL regular season games played thus far).

“Total Value of UFA” is the sum of all of the UFAs “Positional Values” (no special teams) through nine weeks of the regular season.

“Current APY of UFA” is the sum of the current average per year of each of the UFAs contracts.

“Value Over APY of UFA” is the Total Value of UFA less the Current APY of UFA

A positive Value Over APY means the team is currently paying less (on a per-year basis) to their pending 2020 UFAs than our OTC Valuation Metric believes the players are worth (based on their play in the current season). These are players that are contributing quality snaps at their position and the team may look to re-sign.

A negative Value Over APY means the team is currently paying more (per-year) to their pending 2020 UFAs than our OTC Valuation Metric believes the players are worth (based on 2019 production). These are players that are contributing snaps, but not to the caliber of their contract, or those who have been unable to register many snaps to generate value.

To put the team tables (below) into perspective, first here are some leaguewide numbers for Value Over APY (“Overall,” “Offense,” and “Defense” list the # of players):


Overall Team Value Over APY

The average Value Over APY for a full NFL roster is $10,824,088, with an average of 12.28 UFAs per team.

The average Value Over APY for offenses is $4,966,000.56, with an average of 5.47 UFAs per team.

The average Value Over APY for defenses is $5,790,450.72, with an average of 6.81 UFAs per team.

Based on the OTC Valuation metric, Dallas has production from UFAs worth $44 million more than the average NFL team. They have a lot of quality players they need to re-sign. On the other end of the spectrum, Indianapolis is paying more to their pending 2020 UFAs than their production dictates they are worth, so they will probably have no issue letting some of those players walk.


Offense Value Over APY


Defense Value Over APY

Here is each team broken down by division. The Rows are the team overall, then the offense (# of UFAs on Offense), and the defense (# of UFAs on Defense). :

AFC East
AFC North
AFC South
AFC West
NFC East
NFC North
NFC South
NFC West

Finally, I took a look at our projected 2020 Cap Space for each team as compared to their 2020 UFA Value Over APY:

This demonstrates how much cap space would remain if the team signed all of their UFAs to contracts worth what the OTC Valuation Metric has deemed the players’ true worth. No team will do this, but it gives you a better idea of each team’s situation as they approach free agency. For example, Tampa Bay and Arizona have 16 and 19 UFAs respectively. The UFA groups on each team are outperforming their contracts by about $30 million collectively in 2019. However, Tampa Bay has $82.5 million and Arizona has $79.4 million in projected 2020 cap space. So, if they were to sign all of their UFAs to contracts in accordance with the OTC Valuation Metric, they would still have $53.4 million and $45.7 million respectively.

On the other hand, teams like the Giants and Colts will likely be letting the majority of their 2020 UFAs walk, and are more likely to benefit from replacing those players on the roster with others.

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NFL 2019 Snap-shot: 2020 UFA usage through 4 Weeks

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Through one quarter of the NFL season, I wanted to take a look at which teams are giving the most playing time to pending unrestricted free agents (I included players with a 2020 Void Year as UFAs).

All snaps are not created equal, and an injury may have thrust a particular player into a larger role, even though that is not necessarily a good thing for the team. Therefore, it is not automatically a red flag if a team has a lot of UFAs contributing significantly (especially if the team has performed poorly thus far). 

Nevertheless, teams must plan ahead. Certain position groups with several UFAs seeing a lot of snaps could raise eyebrows for a front office. Draft picks and/or free agency dollars could be earmarked based on early 2019 production. 

With that said, I broke down the team-specific positions to keep an eye on.

First, here are the league-wide numbers:

Overall Team Snaps for 2020 UFAs: 

Offensive Snaps for 2020 UFAs:

Defensive Team Snaps for 2020 UFAs:

The breakdown for each team with each player is below. I have also included the projected 2020 Cap Space for each team below:

Columns: Player | Position | Off. Snaps | % of Total | Def. Snaps | % of Total

AFC East

NYJ – $53.7M 2020 Cap Space (34 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $45M Effective Cap Space)

NE – $45.7M 2020 Cap Space (46 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $43.1M Effective Cap Space)

MIA – $115M 2020 Cap Space (41 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $110M Effective Cap Space)

BUF – $86.7M 2020 Cap Space (44 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $83.1M Effective Cap Space)

AFC North

PIT – $2.4M 2020 Cap Space (41 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – (-$2.66M) Effective Cap Space)

CLE – $61.2M 2020 Cap Space (47 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $59.2M Effective Cap Space)

CIN – $60.6M 2020 Cap Space (41 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $55.5M Effective Cap Space)

BAL – $68.9M 2020 Cap Space (39 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $62.7M Effective Cap Space)

AFC South

TEN – $50.4M 2020 Cap Space (38 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $43.8M Effective Cap Space)

JAX – (-$10.5M) 2020 Cap Space (46 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – (-$13M) Effective Cap Space)

IND – $108.9M 2020 Cap Space (42 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $104.3M Effective Cap Space)

HOU – $88.8M 2020 Cap Space (39 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $82.7M Effective Cap Space)

AFC West

OAK – $78.7M 2020 Cap Space (33 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $69.5M Effective Cap Space)

LAC – $62.8M 2020 Cap Space (38 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $56.1M Effective Cap Space)

KC – $23.6M 2020 Cap Space (40 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $18M Effective Cap Space)

DEN – $67M 2020 Cap Space (37 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $59.9M Effective Cap Space)

NFC East

WAS – $53.4M 2020 Cap Space (45 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $50.3M Effective Cap Space)

PHI – $39.3M 2020 Cap Space (36 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $31.7M Effective Cap Space)

NYG – $65.2M 2020 Cap Space (37 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $58.1M Effective Cap Space)

DAL – $92.6M 2020 Cap Space (36 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $85M Effective Cap Space)

NFC North 

MIN – (-$1.2M) 2020 Cap Space (37 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – (-$8.4M) Effective Cap Space)

GB – $25.1M 2020 Cap Space (41 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $20.1M Effective Cap Space)

DET – $46.4M 2020 Cap Space (36 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $38.8M Effective Cap Space)

CHI – $14.6M 2020 Cap Space (35 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $6.5M Effective Cap Space)

NFC South

ATL – (-$8M) 2020 Cap Space (40 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – (-$13.6M) Effective Cap Space)

CAR – $51.6M 2020 Cap Space (37 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $44.5M Effective Cap Space)

NO – $27.1M 2020 Cap Space (39 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $20.1M Effective Cap Space)

TB – $82M 2020 Cap Space (37 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $74.9M Effective Cap Space)

NFC West

SEA – $75.4M 2020 Cap Space (40 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $69.8M Effective Cap Space)

SF – $26.4M 2020 Cap Space (42 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $21.8M Effective Cap Space)

LAR – $37.2M 2020 Cap Space (39 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $31.1M Effective Cap Space)

AZ – $83.3M 2020 Cap Space (32 Players currently under Contract for 2020 – $73.6M Effective Cap Space)

Each team has their own pressing needs, but they also have financial realities they have to deal with moving forward. The rest of the season will go a long way in determining priority extensions and which players teams will let walk. However, the lineup a team rolls out in Week 1 (again, excluding injuries) is the lineup they determined was optimal after Training Camp. We can certainly learn from these figures through four weeks.

As seen on Colin Cowherd’s The Herd